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Modern Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy 
 SAMIR D. PARIKH  
In 1978, changes to the venue rules for bankruptcy cases created 
surprisingly permissive venue selection procedures.  Since that time, 
corporate bankruptcy cases have been characterized by harmful forum 
shopping.  Recently, some skeptics have argued that forum shopping in 
bankruptcy is vastly overstated—a phenomenon that peaked many years 
ago.  An empirical review of the 159 largest bankruptcy cases filed from 
January 1, 2007 to June 30, 2012 establishes that this assessment is false.  
69% of the bankruptcy cases in my study group were forum shopped.  Over 
a two-decade period, the frequency with which large corporate debtors 
forum shopped increased 14%, and the absolute number of such debtors 
who forum shopped increased 130%.  The data indicate a concentrated 
problem that must be addressed.  This Article relies on empirical data and 
theoretical analysis to propose a variety of solutions that would effect 
changes to the bankruptcy venue statute and procedures.  These proposed 
changes culminate in a truly unprecedented recommendation that alters 
fundamental elements of our bankruptcy court structure.  Based in part on 
the system for appeals of patent and trademark rulings, this Article 
proposes the creation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Bankruptcy.  This 
appellate court would establish a critical mass of bankruptcy experts fully 
devoted to addressing disparate treatment of case-dispositive issues across 
the circuits.  The creation of this court would ultimately enhance 
uniformity of bankruptcy law and, when taken together with this Article’s 
other proposed changes, alter forum shoppers’ incentives and means. 
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Modern Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy 
SAMIR D. PARIKH* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In early 2011, the Los Angeles Dodgers were experiencing terminal 
cash flow difficulties due to unfortunate business decisions, declining 
attendance, and deferred compensation payments owed to former players.1  
The team’s financial death spiral had been unfolding for many months and 
prompted Major League Baseball Commissioner Bud Selig to appoint an 
examiner to oversee all aspects of the Dodgers’ business and day-to-day 
operations.2  On June 20, 2011, the Commissioner refused to allow the 
team to enter into a hastily negotiated television contract with Fox Sports 
and urged team owner Frank McCourt to sell the team to a more stable 
ownership group.3 
On June 27, 2011, the Los Angeles Dodgers filed for bankruptcy.4  At 
the time, the team faced the dire prospect of defaulting on its June 30 
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Brian Blum, Brian McMahon, the Honorable Gregg Zive, Jonathan Shenson, Steve Hedberg, and 
Professor Lydia Loren for their insight and comments.  I wish to recognize Jesse Neilson and Ben 
Seiken for their research assistance.  Finally, I thank my family for their unwavering support. 
1 Declaration of Jeffrey J. Ingram in Support of Debtors’ Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day 
Motions at 8, In re L.A. Dodgers LLC, 457 B.R. 308 (Bankr. D. Del. 2011) (No. 11-12010(KG)) 
[hereinafter Declaration of Jeffrey J. Ingram].  
2 Michael McCarthy, Chat, No Clarity for Dodgers, USA TODAY, May 13, 2011, at 5C.  As 
Commissioner, Mr. Selig is able to take this kind of action if he deems it to be in the “the best interests 
of baseball.”  See Bill Madden, Powers that Bud. Selig Has ‘Best Interests of Baseball’—and History—
on His Side in Battle with McCourt, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 24, 2011, at 66 (noting that the MLB 
commissioner’s power has been upheld in two previous cases).  The Supreme Court has exempted 
baseball from federal antitrust laws since 1922.  See Fed. Baseball Club of Balt., Inc. v. Nat’l League of 
Prof’l Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922) (refusing to conclude that providing baseball games is 
a “subject of commerce”); see also Toolson v. N.Y. Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356, 356–57 (1953) (“In 
Federal Baseball Club of Baltimore v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259 U.S. 200 
(1922), this Court held that the business of providing public baseball games for profit between clubs of 
professional baseball players was not within the scope of the federal antitrust laws.”). 
3 Richard Sandomir, Selig Rejects Dodgers’ TV Deal with Fox, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, at 
B13; see McCarthy, supra note 2 (noting that MLB Commissioner Bud Selig did not indicate when and 
if he would sign off on the deal, indicating that the television contract was contingent on MLB’s 
approval). 
4 Bankruptcy Petition, In re L.A. Dodgers, 457 B.R. 308 (No. 11-12010(KG)). 
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payroll.5  Bankruptcy was the only viable option, and the filing did not 
come as a surprise.  However, the location of the filing did.  The Los 
Angeles Dodgers filed for bankruptcy in the District of Delaware.6  The 
iconic Los Angeles baseball team’s primary assets, key employees, 
headquarters, operations, and bankruptcy attorneys were all located in 
Southern California.  The team had no meaningful connection to Delaware, 
but that is where this billion-dollar case landed.7  Why? 
Beginning in 2007, a torrent of large-scale bankruptcy cases flooded 
the courts and reintroduced the unique forum shopping problem that 
permeates the corporate bankruptcy world.8  In 1991, Professors Lynn 
LoPucki and William Whitford were the first to publicize the forum 
shopping phenomenon in bankruptcy.9  Their article presented an empirical 
study of the bankruptcy reorganizations of the forty-three largest publicly 
held companies that were filed and completed between 1979 and 1988.10  
The study found that a “substantial number” of cases had forum shopped.11  
Over twenty years have passed since the publication of this seminal article.  
The flurry of bankruptcy filings during the last five years provide a wealth 
of useful data for understanding new trends in the field and warrant a re-
examination of the forum shopping phenomenon that many believe has 
dissipated. 
By gathering and evaluating empirical data for the 159 largest 
bankruptcy cases filed from January 1, 2007 to June 30, 2012 (the “Great 
Recession”), I was able to determine whether forum shopping is still a 
systemic issue in bankruptcy.  The results were significant.  The forum 
shopping phenomenon that Professors LoPucki and Whitford first 
identified in 1991 was actually amplified in the Great Recession.  Seven 
                                                                                                                          
5 See Declaration of Jeffrey J. Ingram, supra note 1, at 14. 
6 Bankruptcy Petition, supra note 4. 
7 On April 13, 2012, the Delaware bankruptcy court approved a sale of the team and substantially 
all of its assets to Guggenheim Baseball Management for over $1.5 billion.  See Exhibit A, LLC 
Interest Purchase Agreement, In re L.A. Dodgers, 457 B.R. 308 (No. 11-12010(KG)) (showing the 
purchase price). 
8 See infra Part III (introducing post-2007 research regarding this wave of large-scale bankruptcy 
cases). 
9 See Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Venue Choice and Forum Shopping in the 
Bankruptcy Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 1991 WIS. L. REV. 11, 12 n.2 (noting 
the lack of scholarly work and empirical studies on forum shopping).  Professors LoPucki and Whitford 
use the term “‘forum shop[ping]’ . . . to refer to the ultimate choice of a venue where the company has 
little or no physical presence.”  Id. at 14.  To state this another way, “forum shopping” is generally used 
as a pejorative to describe company executives’ strategic maneuvering to file for bankruptcy in a 
district that bears no material relationship to the debtor’s principal assets or principal place of business 
because the executives believe that the choice will lead to some significant benefit to themselves, the 
debtor, or key constituencies.  See id. (“‘Forum shopping’ is commonly defined as attempting to have 
one’s case heard in the forum where it has the greatest chance of success.”). 
10 Id. at 12. 
11 Id. 
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out of ten corporate debtors in my study group forum shopped.  I also 
independently gathered data that revealed the means of forum shopping.  
Therefore, my empirical analysis helped me (i) establish that the forum 
shopping phenomenon continues to plague the bankruptcy system, and 
(ii) isolate the primary statutory bases on which debtors relied in order to 
forum shop. 
Based on my research and the means by which corporate debtors 
forum shop, my Article proposes a variety of solutions that effect changes 
to the bankruptcy venue statute and bankruptcy procedure.  These changes 
culminate in a truly unprecedented recommendation that alters 
fundamental elements of our bankruptcy court structure.  Specifically, I 
propose the creation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Bankruptcy that 
would hear all appeals from district court and bankruptcy appellate panel 
rulings.  The new court would be premised on the system for appeals of 
patent and trademark rulings, and establish a critical mass of bankruptcy 
experts fully devoted to addressing the disparate treatment of case-
dispositive issues across the circuits.  One of the primary benefits would be 
to enhance uniformity of bankruptcy law and mitigate forum shopping. 
Part II provides a historical perspective on the venue rules in 
bankruptcy.  The debate regarding forum shopping is distorted by a 
number of significant misunderstandings regarding the history of the venue 
rules and the policy behind them.  This section presents historical insight 
and clarification that does not appear in other scholarship on the issue.  
Part III presents empirical data from the largest 159 bankruptcy cases filed 
during the Great Recession.  This section culminates in a detailed analysis 
of the state of forum shopping in bankruptcy and the means by which 
corporate debtors forum shop.  Part IV explains how corporate debtors use 
bankruptcy’s permissive venue rules to facilitate forum shopping.  Part V 
explores forum shoppers’ motivations and the harm that rampant forum 
shopping can cause to the integrity and operation of the bankruptcy system.  
Finally, Part VI details my proposed solutions to the forum shopping 
problem in bankruptcy. 
Ultimately, my extensive empirical research establishes that the forum 
shopping phenomenon identified in 1991 was amplified in the last five 
years.  This Article presents a multifaceted approach to a multifaceted 
problem by proposing solutions that target the bankruptcy venue statute, 
bankruptcy procedure, and fundamental elements of bankruptcy court 
structure.  By directing efforts on three different levels, I believe the 
proposals effect change in a comprehensive and unprecedented way.  The 
proposals do not attempt to eliminate all forms of forum shopping.  Rather, 
I propose myriad solutions that, when taken together, install basic 
boundaries and limitations on a harmful practice that is beginning to 
predominate. 
 164 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:159 
II.  FORUM SHOPPING IN BANKRUPTCY 
A.  The Unique Posture of Forum Shopping in Bankruptcy 
Jurisdiction is about power; venue is about location.12  Jurisdiction of 
the federal courts involves a court’s ability to adjudicate a dispute and 
represents a congressional grant of authority to the courts.13  Therefore, 
parties to a dispute cannot confer federal jurisdiction on a court.  However, 
venue rules are not jurisdictional provisions but exist to serve the interests 
of justice and the convenience of all parties in interest.14  Venue is best 
understood as the locality of a lawsuit.  It is the determination of where 
judicial authority may be exercised as determined by applicable legislation 
that considers a variety of blatant and subtle factors. 
All civil proceedings have select venues that are optimal for 
adjudication of the dispute.  Scholars have dubbed these optimal venues 
“natural forums”—places that most effectively consider local interests in 
the dispute, the parties involved, the parties affected, and the convenience 
of the parties, counsel, and witnesses.15  Determining the natural forum for 
a dispute can oftentimes be troublesome. 
In bankruptcy, the complexity of the process to find a natural forum is 
affected by the context of the case.  Individuals who file a bankruptcy 
petition are required to file in the district in which they reside.16  With 
some exceptions, this determination is easily made and difficult to 
manipulate.  Modern venue rules for natural persons have remained 
virtually unchanged since the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 
(the “1898 Bankruptcy Act”). 
On the other hand, determining the natural forum for the bankruptcy 
case of a multinational corporation is far more convoluted.  In typical civil 
litigation, the plaintiff chooses from a variety of venue options—all of 
which are presumed to be fair to the defendant because they are based on 
the defendant’s actions or business.17  To the extent the plaintiff’s choice is 
                                                                                                                          
12 Richard F. Broude, Jurisdiction and Venue Under the Bankruptcy Act of 1973, 48 AM. BANKR. 
L.J. 231, 243 (1974). 
13 E.g., Neirbo Co. v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 308 U.S. 165, 167 (1939). 
14 See United States v. Laird, 412 F.2d 16, 20 (2d Cir. 1969) (“Venue is a forum limitation 
imposed for the convenience of the parties. . . . [I]t may be conferred on a court either by consent or by 
the failure of the defendant to make a timely objection.”); In re Bankers Trust, 403 F.2d 16, 22 (7th Cir. 
1968) (“Ordinarily, no doubt the venue rules in bankruptcy will serve the interest of justice . . . .”).  
15 See, e.g., Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1691 (1990) 
(referring to “natural forum” as “the one closest to, most knowledgeable about, or most accessible to 
the litigants”). 
16 See 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006) (“[A] case under title 11 may be commenced in the district court 
for the district . . . in which the domicile, residence, principal place of business in the United States, or 
principal assets in the United States, of the person or entity that is the subject of such case . . . .”). 
17 See Earl M. Maltz, Choice of Forum and Choice of Law in the Federal Courts: A 
Reconsideration of Erie Principles, 79 KY. L.J. 231, 236 (1991) (noting that the rationale behind rules 
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in fact inappropriate, the defendant has the right to attempt to have the 
plaintiff’s choice overturned by the chosen court.18  But the defendant does 
not have the right ex post to designate the specific court that will hear the 
lawsuit.19  This process attempts to strike a reasonable balance.  The 
defendant’s actions and business provide a limited fora of venue options, 
but the plaintiff has the option of choosing any venue from those fora.20 
Conversely, in bankruptcy, the party who is unable to pay its debts—
the presumptive defendant in any other civil context—is the party 
instituting the proceeding and selecting venue to increase its chances of a 
favorable conclusion.21  In bankruptcy, the harmed parties—usually 
unsecured creditors—are at the mercy of the debtor’s venue selection.22  
The permissive venue rules in bankruptcy afford a corporate debtor 
virtually unlimited venue options.  From those options, the corporate 
debtor can choose the venue that it believes will be most favorable to 
ownership, management, insiders, or lenders depending on which party 
exercises the most control and leverage over the decision-making 
process.23  There is almost no transparency in this process and, as 
explained below, once the decision is made, it is extremely difficult to 
undo. 
Formulating a proper understanding of the multifaceted problem of 
forum shopping in bankruptcy begins with exploring the genesis of the 
permissive venue rules that created the phenomenon. 
B.  A Historical Perspective on the Venue Rules in Bankruptcy 
Since the enactment of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act,24 the uncertainty 
regarding the natural forum for corporate bankruptcy cases and a lack of 
understanding regarding the gravity of such issues have led to significant 
shifts in venue rules.  Section 2(1) of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act provided 
that “persons” adjudged bankrupt could file a bankruptcy petition in the 
“territorial jurisdiction” where they had “their principal place of business, 
                                                                                                                          
meant to counter forum shopping “rests on the view that it is unfair to allow a nonresident [plaintiff] to 
‘shop’ between state and federal courts in order to obtain legal doctrine more favorable to his case”). 
18 28 U.S.C. § 1412. 
19 See id. (specifying that the district court may transfer a case to another district court). 
20 NAT’L BANKR. REVIEW COMM’N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS 783 (1997). 
21 See id. (noting that in bankruptcy actions, unlike in other civil actions, “[a] multitude of parties 
that are not necessarily adverse to each other are brought into the bankruptcy court by the debtor to 
determine the claims and interests in the property of the estate”).  
22 See id. at 782 (noting the “disenfranchisement of small creditors in the current venue statute”). 
23 See id. (asserting that “when a few judges, by virtue of sitting in desirable venues, are the only 
judges to review certain issues, the system breaks down,” and arguing that “[d]eleting state of 
incorporation as a venue option [would] increase[] the number of courts that can decide important 
issues”). 
24 Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 
Stat. 2549. 
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resided or had their domicile . . . for the preceding six months,” or for a 
longer portion of the preceding six months than in any other jurisdiction.25  
The section failed to distinguish between natural persons and fictitious 
entities, such as corporations.  Consequently, courts initially tasked with 
applying this venue rule to corporate debtors were forced to formulate their 
own definitions.  As a result, courts ruled that the term “domicile” 
indicated a corporation’s state of incorporation.26  Thus, a corporation was 
allowed to file in any district of the state in which it was incorporated. 
In 1934, Congress affirmed the judiciary’s approach by adding section 
77B to the federal bankruptcy laws.27  Section 77B addressed corporate 
reorganizations and provided that a bankruptcy petition could be filed with 
a court “in whose territorial jurisdiction the corporation, during the 
preceding six months or the greater portion thereof . . . had its principal 
place of business or its principal assets, or in any territorial jurisdiction in 
the State in which it was incorporated.”28  However, once codified, this 
venue rule was short-lived. 
In 1938, the Chandler Act29 (also known as the “1938 Bankruptcy 
Act”) made significant changes to the theory and practice of bankruptcy 
law.  Congress created chapter X, which applied exclusively to large 
corporations with outstanding public debt or securities.30  In drafting a 
specific venue provision for chapter X debtors, Congress reversed course 
and rejected the judiciary’s approach to allowing a corporation’s state of 
incorporation to serve as a basis for venue.  Section 128 explicitly 
eliminated that option for chapter X debtors and allowed a filing only in a 
“court in whose territorial jurisdiction the corporation . . . had its principal 
place of business or its principal assets for the preceding six months or for 
a longer portion of the preceding six months than in any other 
                                                                                                                          
25 Id. § 2(1).  The 1898 Bankruptcy Act promulgated the distinction between a bankrupt party’s 
“residence” and “domicile,” as explained infra Part IV.C.1. 
26  See, e.g., In re Hudson River Nav. Corp., 59 F.2d 971, 973 (2d Cir. 1932) (finding that since 
the corporation was incorporated in Delaware, it had its “residence and domicile in that state”); In re 
R.C. Stanley Shoe Co., 8 F. Supp. 681, 683 (D.N.H. 1934) (“[A] corporation may be organized under 
the laws of one state and have its principal place of business in another state and there be jurisdiction in 
both states to adjudge the corporation a bankrupt.”). 
27 Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 77B, 48 Stat. 911, 912, repealed by Chandler Act, ch. 575, 52 
Stat. 840 (1938). 
28 Id. 
29 52 Stat. 840. 
30 Samir D. Parikh, The Improper Application of the Clear and Convincing Standard of Proof:  
Are Bankruptcy Courts Distorting Accepted Risk Allocation Schemes?, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 271, 300 
(2009).  The 1938 Bankruptcy Act contained four chapters for business reorganizations.  H.R. REP. NO. 
95-595, at 221 (1977).  Chapter VIII applied to railroad reorganizations.  Id.  Chapter X generally 
applied only to corporations with outstanding public debt or securities.  See id. (“Chapter X was 
designed for a thorough financial reorganization of a corporation.”).  Chapter XI applied to small 
business entities, partnerships, and individuals.  Id.  And chapter XII covered business entities involved 
in real estate.  Id. 
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jurisdiction.”31  This change was based on the recommendation of the 
National Bankruptcy Conference’s drafting committee.32  The House 
Report on the Chandler Act explained the change: 
In general, the bill sets up as the only valid criterion for 
jurisdiction the company’s principal place of business, or the 
place of location of its principal assets.  Selection of any 
other jurisdiction usually means conducting the 
reorganization at great distances from the place or places 
where the corporation does its business.  It means putting 
investors to great expense and difficulty if they wish to 
appear and participate in the proceedings.  It means, also, 
that inside groups who may be in control of a reorganization, 
are able to search around for the jurisdiction in which they 
estimate it is least likely, for a number of reasons, that their 
conduct of the corporation will be examined; that they will be 
exposed to liability, and their perpetuation in office 
endangered.  These defects have been met and corrected by 
the bill, in limiting the venue of reorganization proceedings 
to the principal place of business or the location of the 
corporation’s principal assets . . . .33 
Section 128 demonstrates a congressional repudiation, based on a clear 
policy rationale, of the judiciary’s interpretation of section 2a(1) of the 
1898 Bankruptcy Act. 
In 1973, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the 
Judicial Conference of the United States endorsed this repudiation34 in 
                                                                                                                          
31 Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840, 886, repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549. 
32 See Alfred N. Heuston, Corporate Reorganizations Under the Chandler Act, 38 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1199, 1204 & n.17 (1938) (detailing a letter sent from the Chairman of the National Bankruptcy 
Conference to a Senator). 
33 H.R. REP. NO. 75-1409, at 40 (1937) (emphasis added). 
34 The Federal Rules of Practice and Procedure govern the conduct of trials, appeals, and cases 
under title 11 of the United States Code.  28 U.S.C. § 2075 (2006).  The Rules Enabling Act of 1934 
authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of procedure, which have the force and effect of law.  
Id. § 2072.  The Court has delegated the work and oversight of the rulemaking process to             
committees of the Judicial Conference, the principal policy-making body of the U.S. Courts.                            
1 ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, GUIDE TO JUDICIARY POLICY § 440.10 (2011), available  
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Procedures_for_Rules_Cmtes.pdf.  The 
Judicial Conference’s Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure (the “Standing Committee”) 
“carry on a continuous study of the operation and effect” of the federal rules as directed by the Rules 
Enabling Act.  COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF                         
THE U.S., SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON                            
RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE C-19 (2011), available 
at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2011.pdf.  Advisory 
committees receive comments from a variety of parties and formulate proposed changes to specific 
provisions.  See id. at C-22 (“At the conclusion of the comment period the reporter shall prepare a 
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drafting the new bankruptcy rules.  By order dated April 24, 1973, 
effective October 1, 1973, the Supreme Court prescribed the Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure (the “Bankruptcy Rules”).35  In an attempt to avoid 
the confusion caused by section 2a(1) of the 1898 Bankruptcy Act, 
Bankruptcy Rule 116 provided unique and separate treatment for natural 
persons and fictitious entities, including corporations and partnerships, and 
displaced all previous venue rules.36  Rule 116(a)(1) was titled “Natural 
Persons” and exclusively addressed venue for individual debtors.37  Rule 
116(a)(2) was titled “Corporation or Partnership” and exclusively 
addressed venue for corporate debtors.38  Rule 116(a) followed chapter X’s 
approach and allowed corporate debtors to file only in a district where the 
debtor had its principal place of business or principal assets or where an 
affiliate of the debtor had already filed.39  The Advisory Committee Notes 
that accompanied the change acknowledged that the new rule was 
specifically derived from § 128 of chapter X and explicitly “eliminate[d] 
the notion that residence or domicile may serve as a useful basis for 
                                                                                                                          
summary of the written comments received and the testimony presented at public hearings.”).  The 
Standing Committee independently reviews the findings of the advisory committees and, if satisfied, 
recommends changes to the Judicial Conference, which in turn recommends changes to the Supreme 
Court.  Id. at C-24.  The Court considers the proposals and can choose to officially promulgate the 
revised rules.  See id. at 1 (transmitting proposed amendments to the Rules to “the Supreme Court for 
its consideration with a recommendation that they be adopted by the Court and transmitted to 
Congress”).  Congress can enact legislation to reject, modify, or defer the pending rules.   
35 411 U.S. 989 (1973). 
36 Although section 2a(1) is framed as a jurisdiction provision, it was interpreted as a venue 
provision.  See Bass v. Hutchins, 417 F.2d 692, 694 (5th Cir. 1969) (“Since 1952 the courts . . . have 
consistently held that § 2(a)(1) . . . is a true venue provision and is not jurisdiction confining or 
defining.”).  Therefore, the Supreme Court was within its power to promulgate a bankruptcy rule 
altering section 2a(1)’s venue provision.  Puerto Rico v. Commonwealth Oil Ref. Co., 596 F.2d 1239, 
1244 n.14 (5th Cir. 1979).  
37 Rule 116(a)(1) stated that: 
A petition by or against a natural person may be filed only in the district where the 
bankrupt has had his principal place of business, residence or domicile for the 
preceding 6 months or for a longer portion thereof than in any other district.  A 
petition by or against a natural person who has had no principal place of business, 
residence, or domicile within the United States during the preceding 6 months may 
be filed only in a district wherein he has property. 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 116(a)(1) (1973) (repealed 1978). 
38 Rule 116(a)(2) stated that: 
A petition by or against a corporation or partnership may be filed only in the district 
where the bankrupt has had its principal place of business or principal assets for the 
preceding six months or for a longer portion thereof than in any other district, or, if 
there is no such district, in any district where the bankrupt has property. 
FED. R. BANKR. P. 116(a)(2) (1973) (repealed 1978). 
39 FED. R. BANKR. P. 116(a)(2), (4) (1973) (repealed 1978). 
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determining venue of a corporation or partnership.”40  The committee 
likely reasoned that “[t]he place of incorporation frequently [had] no 
relation to the business activity of the corporation . . . .”41 
The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 197842 (the “1978 Bankruptcy Act”) 
brought the rules governing venue under title 28 of the United States 
Code.43  The 1978 Bankruptcy Act also consolidated many of the chapters 
governing business reorganizations.44  This consolidation permeated the 
new venue rules.  At the time, 28 U.S.C. § 1472 established one venue 
provision governing all debtors, eliminating the clear demarcation for 
individual and corporate debtors.45  The section provided that a bankruptcy 
petition could be filed in the district in which: (i) the person or entity was 
domiciled, resided, or had its principal place of business or principal 
assets; or (ii) the person’s affiliate, general partner, or partnership had a 
pending case.46  Under 1 U.S.C. § 1, “person” is defined to include 
corporations and partnerships as well as individuals.47 
Section 1472’s legislative history provides no explanation for this 
consolidation of previously distinct venue provisions.48  The floor 
                                                                                                                          
40 COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED BANKRUPTCY RULES AND OFFICIAL FORMS UNDER CHAPTERS I TO 
VII OF THE BANKRUPTCY ACT 35 (1971).    
41 12 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 116.03[2] (James W. Moore & Lawrence P. King eds., 14th ed. 
1978) (emphasis added).  Note that from 1973 to 1978, the proper venue for filing a bankruptcy petition 
was governed by the Bankruptcy Rules and not a statute enacted by Congress. 
42 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C. 
(2012)). 
43 Id. § 224 (last codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1472 (1982)).  This section was technically repealed and 
replaced by section 102(a) of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 (the 
“1984 Act”).  Pub L. No. 98-353, § 102, 98 Stat. 333, 334 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006)).  But 
28 U.S.C. § 1408 essentially duplicated § 1472 verbatim; the only change was the deletion of a comma 
and spelling out “180.”  In re Donald, 328 B.R. 192, 201 n.5 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005). 
44 The rationale for this consolidation was that there was no reason to maintain separate chapters 
for small and large corporate debtors.  The legislature pulled what it deemed to be the best provisions 
out of chapters X and XI and enacted a new consolidated chapter 11.  H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 223 
(1977). 
45 28 U.S.C. § 1472 (1982). 
46 Id. 
47 There is some confusion regarding which defined terms are applicable to provisions under title 
28.  Many of the terms found in 28 U.S.C. § 1472 and 28 U.S.C. § 1408, its successor, are defined in 
title 11 of the United States Code (the “Bankruptcy Code”).  However, terms defined in title 11 are 
only applicable to provisions found in title 11.  Title 1 of the United States Code contains a variety of 
defined terms that apply throughout the United States Code, including title 28. 
48 As noted by Professor Kenneth N. Klee in Legislative History of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28 
DEPAUL L. REV. 941, 942 (1979), the 1978 Bankruptcy Act followed an unorthodox route to 
enactment.  Therefore, in analyzing the legislative history of the act, one must consult the following 
authorities in this order:  
1. floor statement of Congressman Don Edwards, October 6, 1978, on final passage 
of H.R. 8200; 2. floor statement of Senator DeConcini, October 5, 1978, on passage 
of the final Senate amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 8200; 3. floor 
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statements and congressional reports and hearings all completely ignore 
§ 1472’s drastic change to the venue rules.  The only direct references to 
the change appear in the House Report and Senate Report, but neither is 
insightful.  The House Report merely notes that § 1472 is “derived from 
section 2a of the [1898] Bankruptcy Act.”49  The Senate Report is similarly 
opaque, noting that the new venue rules are “derived from section 2a(1) of 
the Bankruptcy Act and Rule 116 of the Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.”50 
The legislature’s motivation for the apparent shift in the venue rules is 
entirely unclear.  Congress may have intended to simplify the language of 
the venue provision and believed that the changes had no real effect.   
More specifically, Congress may have believed that the concepts of 
“domicile” and “residence” did not properly apply to corporate debtors.  
Therefore, a corporate debtor would still be limited to a filing based on its 
principal assets, its place of business, or an affiliate’s place of filing. 
An alternative explanation is that Congress sought to return to the 
venue rules under section 2a(1) and simply allow a corporate debtor to rely 
on its state of incorporation in selecting venue.  But this explanation is 
flawed.  If this was truly Congress’s intent, the shift in the venue rules was 
drastic.  For such a drastic change to be made without any discussion or 
explanation appears unlikely.  Further, if Congress did intend to allow a 
corporate debtor to rely on its state of incorporation, it could have returned 
                                                                                                                          
statement of Congressman Don Edwards, September 28, 1978, on passage of the 
House amendment to the Senate amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 
8200; 4. floor statement of Senator DeConcini, September 7, 1978, on initial passage 
of the Senate amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 8200; 5. Senate Report 
of the Finance Committee to accompany S. 2266 filed by Senator Long on August 
10, 1978; 6. Senate Report of the Judiciary Committee to accompany S. 2266 filed 
by Senator DeConcini on July 14, 1978; 7. floor statement of Congressman Don 
Edwards, February 1, 1978, on passage of H.R. 8200, as amended; 8. floor statement 
of Congressman Don Edwards, October 27, 1977, on consideration of H.R. 8200; 9. 
House Report of the Judiciary Committee to accompany H.R. 8200 as reported filed 
by Congressman Don Edwards, September 8, 1977. 
Id. at 957–58 (footnotes omitted). 
49 H.R. REP. NO. 95-595, at 446 (1977). 
50 S.R. REP. NO. 95-989, at 155 (1978).  The only discussion of the topic in the congressional 
hearings on the act is inconclusive.  On January 13, 1978, A. Daniel O’Neal, Chairman of the Interstate 
Commerce Commission (ICC), appeared before a subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary 
regarding the proposed 1978 Bankruptcy Act.  Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 2266 
and H.R. 8200 Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Mach., 95th Cong. 750 (1977).  
Senator Dennis DeConcini, Chairman of the subcommittee, asked Mr. O’Neal what venue rules should 
be in place for railroads that file for bankruptcy.  Id.  Mr. O’Neal was unsure of the ICC’s position at 
the time of the hearing, but wrote to Senator DeConcini the following month.  Id. at 1309–11 (Feb. 1, 
1978 letter from A. Daniel O’Neal to Sen. Dennis DeConcini).  In his letter, Mr. O’Neal stated that the 
ICC’s position was that a railroad company should be allowed to file only in the territorial jurisdiction 
where it had its principal executive or operating office during the preceding six months.  Id. at 1310.  
According to the ICC, this was the “logical” place to require a filing for a variety of reasons, including 
the fact that “such a provision [would] eliminate[] the possibility of forum shopping.”  Id. at 1311. 
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to the explicit language of section 77B of the 1934 amendments to the 
1898 Bankruptcy Act.  But it did not do so. 
More likely, the genesis for § 1472 was the desire to simplify the 
language of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act, with unintended consequences 
regarding forum shopping.  Indeed, § 128 and its progeny involved three 
thoroughly detailed venue provisions tailored to three distinct types of 
debtors.  Section 1472 provided one condensed paragraph that applied to 
all debtors.  Congress may have been motivated by the allure of simplicity 
and failed to understand the consequences.  If Congress had in fact made 
such an oversight, its error was at least shared by legal commentators and 
scholars in the field at that time.  In fact, none of the law review articles 
that explained the 1978 Bankruptcy Act appreciated the significance of the 
venue rule changes; the majority of these articles did not even 
acknowledge that changes had been made.51  However, in context, this 
oversight may not be as glaring as it first appears.  At the time § 1472 was 
enacted, bankruptcy was not a vital component of properly functioning 
business markets.  There were few large multimillion-dollar bankruptcy 
cases, and forum shopping by such debtors was not a concern because 
venue provisions had not been abused.52  Without an understanding of the 
risk of forum shopping and lacking an appreciation of the unique harm that 
forum shopping in bankruptcy could pose, Congress, legal commentators, 
and scholars may have all viewed § 1472’s changes as mere streamlining 
of an unnecessarily detailed provision. 
In the subsequent years, the new venue rules drew scant attention and 
were eventually incorporated into the Bankruptcy Amendments and 
                                                                                                                          
51 See Richard I. Aaron, The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978: The Full-Employment-for-Lawyers 
Bill, 1979 UTAH L. REV. 1, 1–2 (noting the new venue rules but failing to appreciate the significance of 
the changes); Conrad K. Cyr, Structuring a New Bankruptcy Court: A Comparative Analysis, 52 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 141 (1978) (failing to mention the changes to the venue rules); Frank R. Kennedy, 
Partnerships and Partners Under the Bankruptcy Reform Act and the New (Proposed) Bankruptcy 
Rules, 27 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 507, 563–64 (1983) (merely noting that the new venue rules follow Federal 
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 116 “fairly closely” but failing to grasp the consequence of the deviation 
from Rule 116); Frank R. Kennedy, The Bankruptcy Court Under the New Bankruptcy Law: Its 
Structure, Jurisdiction, Venue, and Procedure, 11 ST. MARY’S L.J. 251, 297 (1979) (explaining the 
new language of section 1472 but failing to appreciate the significance of the shift from Rule 116(a)); 
Lawrence P. King, Chapter 11 of the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 107 (1979) (failing 
to mention the changes to the venue rules); Kenneth N. Klee, The New Bankruptcy Act of 1978, 64 
A.B.A. J. 1865 (1978) (failing to mention the changes to the venue rules); Martin I. Klein, Bankruptcy 
Reform Act of 1978, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 5 (1979) (noting that there are “new venue provisions” but 
failing to explain the significance of the changes); Arthur L. Moller, Chapter 11 of the 1978 
Bankruptcy Code or Whatever Happened to Good Old Chapter XI?, 11 ST. MARY’S L.J. 437 (1979) 
(failing to mention the changes to the venue rules); Donald Lee Rome, The New Bankruptcy Act and 
the Commercial Lender, 96 BANKING L.J. 389 (1979) (failing to mention the changes to the venue 
rules). 
52 LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE:  HOW COMPETITION FOR BIG CASES IS CORRUPTING 
THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 38 (2005). 
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Federal Judgeship Act of 198453—though the applicable section was 
renumbered as § 1408.  Since its 1978 enactment, the language of the 
bankruptcy venue rules is substantially unaltered. 
The 1978 changes simplified the venue rules by providing one section 
that covers all debtors.  However, this consolidation has brought the debate 
regarding venue full circle.  By forcing individual and corporate debtors 
under the same provision, the terms “domicile” and “residence”—concepts 
ill-suited for corporate debtors—are back in a provision governing such 
debtors.54 
Exploring the genesis of the venue rules in bankruptcy furthers an 
understanding of corporate debtors’ ability to forum shop but not whether 
such parties are actually doing so.  In fact, some skeptics argue that forum 
shopping in bankruptcy is vastly overstated—a phenomenon that peaked 
many years ago.55  This argument is empirically false. 
                                                                                                                          
53 Pub L. No. 98-353, § 102, 98 Stat. 333, 334 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006)).  For reasons 
outside the scope of this Article, venue is actually placed with the district courts, rather than the 
bankruptcy courts.  This fact has no material effect on the discussion herein.   
54 Proponents of the current venue rules have frequently argued that the history of the bankruptcy 
venue statute indicates conscious and definitive support for permissive rules.  See REPORT OF THE 
DELAWARE STATE BAR ASSOCIATION TO THE NATIONAL BANKRUPTCY REVIEW COMMISSION IN 
SUPPORT OF MAINTAINING EXISTING VENUE CHOICES 6–7 (1996) (discussing the history of the 
bankruptcy venue statute); see also Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Venue Reform Act of 2011: Hearing on 
H.R. 2533 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Commercial & Admin. Law, 112th Cong. 24–25 (2011) 
[hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 2533] (statement of David Skeel, Professor of Law, University of 
Pennsylvania Law School) (discussing the history of the bankruptcy statute and the need for permissive 
rules).  More specifically, these proponents argue that, except for a brief five-year period from 1973 to 
1978, corporate debtors have always been allowed to file in their state of incorporation.  Thus, the 
argument goes, any change to the current venue rules would overturn a long-standing provision and 
practice.  This argument indicates a profound misunderstanding.  The history of the bankruptcy venue 
statute actually argues against allowing a corporate debtor to rely on its state of incorporation in 
selecting venue.  As explained, Congress only affirmatively endorsed a corporate debtor’s state of 
incorporation as a basis for venue in 1934, and that decision was promptly repudiated in 1938.  See 
supra text accompanying notes 29–33.  From 1938 to 1978, state of incorporation was not a basis for 
venue for corporations with publicly held debt or securities, though it remained a basis for other types 
of business organizations.  In referencing the history of bankruptcy venue provisions prior to 1978, 
proponents of the current permissive venue rules focus on venue provisions that affected natural 
persons or corporations that had no publicly held debt or securities.  But the forum shopping 
phenomenon currently affecting the bankruptcy system involves publicly held corporations, not natural 
persons or other types of business organizations.  This incongruence is overlooked and perpetuates a 
fundamental misunderstanding regarding the history of the bankruptcy venue provisions.  Ultimately, 
as will be explored further in this Article, the history of the bankruptcy venue statute does not support 
recognizing state of incorporation as a basis for a corporate debtor’s venue choice. 
55 See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 2533, supra note 54, at 25 (opining that the case for repudiation of 
the tradition allowing corporations to file for bankruptcy in their state of incorporation is not 
undeniable or overwhelming).  
 2013] MODERN FORUM SHOPPING IN BANKRUPTCY 173 
III.  EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE MODERN 
FORUM SHOPPING PHENOMENON 
Professor Lynn M. LoPucki is credited with not only identifying the 
problem of forum shopping56 in bankruptcy but also providing key 
empirical data that substantiated the phenomenon.  In 1991, LoPucki and 
Professor William Whitford explored the concept of forum shopping in 
bankruptcy.57  Their article presented an empirical study of the bankruptcy 
reorganizations of the forty-three largest publicly held companies that filed 
between 1979 and 1988.58  The study found that a “substantial number” of 
cases had forum shopped, with the bankruptcy court in the Southern 
District of New York often being the forum of choice.59  In subsequent 
years, LoPucki continued to explore this area of law.60  His research 
culminated with his 2005 book Courting Failure,61 which attempted to 
explain and quantify the forum shopping problem. 
More than twenty years have passed since Professors LoPucki and 
Whitford’s seminal article on forum shopping, and eight years have passed 
since the release of the controversial book Courting Failure.  The 
bankruptcy filings sparked by the Great Recession provide ample data that 
is useful for understanding new trends in this field and warrant a 
reconsideration of the forum shopping phenomenon. 
I analyzed data aggregated by Professor LoPucki and conducted my 
own empirical research to determine whether forum shopping is still a 
systemic issue in bankruptcy and, if so, what statutory bases are supporting 
the practice. 
A.  The Data and Methodology 
In 1994, Professor LoPucki created the UCLA-Bankruptcy Research 
                                                                                                                          
56 For a detailed definition of “forum shopping,” see supra note 9.  
57 LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 9. 
58 Id. at 12. 
59 Id. 
60 See generally Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for Judges: An Empirical 
Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 967 (1999) 
(seeking to explain the pattern of forum shopping); Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Why Are 
Delaware and New York Bankruptcy Reorganizations Failing?, 55 VAND. L. REV. 1933 (2002) 
(reporting the results of a study designed to confirm that New York’s and Delaware’s higher refiling 
rates indicate higher failure rates and inquiring into the reasons for those failure rates); Lynn M. 
LoPucki & Sara D. Kalin, The Failure of Public Company Bankruptcies in Delaware and New York: 
Empirical Evidence of a “Race to the Bottom,” 54 VAND. L. REV. 231 (2001) (concluding that the 
excessive rate of bankruptcy filings by emerging companies appears to be the product of wasteful 
competition among courts); Lynn M. LoPucki & William C. Whitford, Patterns in the Bankruptcy 
Reorganization of Large, Publicly Held Companies, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 597 (1993) (providing 
information for others to use in their evaluation of the success of chapter 11).  
61 LOPUCKI, supra note 52. 
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Database (the “BRD”).62  The BRD includes data on all bankruptcy cases 
filed by or against public companies in the United States bankruptcy courts 
since October 1, 1979.63  Court files and Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) filings represent the source of most of the data, while 
some information is pulled from newspaper accounts, newsletters, 
company websites, and surveys.64  BRD generally analyzes the location of 
a company’s headquarters and the venue of its reorganization case to 
determine instances of likely forum shopping.65  Professor LoPucki 
allowed me to review data for all 159 public debtors66 (i) with 
                                                                                                                          
62 Today, access to the BRD’s data can be requested online.  Request Download, UCLA-LOPUCKI 
BANKR. RESEARCH DATABASE, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/request_download.htm (last visited Aug. 
30, 2013).  Many scholars have disagreed with Professor LoPucki’s conclusions and methodologies.  
See, e.g., Harvey Miller, Chapter 11 Reorganization Cases and the Delaware Myth, 55 VAND. L. REV. 
1987, 1997 (2002) (“The LoPucki and Kalin theory is flawed. . . . Consistent failure rates in New York 
and Deleware, two venues that attract the most sophisticated and complex organizations, indict the 
reorganization process, not the courts.”); Robert K. Rasmussen, Empirically Bankrupt, 2007 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 179, 229–30 (“Locating the driving force behind LoPucki’s empirical claims in only a 
subset of the cases thus renders his empirical assertions unreliable.”); Robert K. Rasmussen & Randall 
S. Thomas, Whither the Race? A Comment on the Effects of the Delawarization of Corporate 
Reorganizations, 54 VAND. L. REV. 283, 285–86 (2001) (“LoPucki and Kalin have looked at one type 
of capital restructuring after an initial reorganization—a second bankruptcy—but have neglected to 
scrutinize the reasons why a large number of firms, well over half, dropped out of their study.”); Robert 
K. Rasmussen & Randall S. Thomas, Timing Matters: Promoting Forum Shopping by Insolvent 
Corporations, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1389 (2000) [hereinafter Rasmussen & Thomas, Timing 
Matters] (“Professors Eisenberg and LoPucki fail to consider the choices that debtors’ attorneys face 
when advising their clients on where to file.”); David A. Skeel, Jr., What’s So Bad About Delaware?, 
54 VAND. L. REV. 309, 314 (2001) [hereinafter Skeel, What’s so Bad About Delaware?] (“LoPucki and 
Kalin further complicate matters by equating the Delaware premium in corporate law with troubled 
firms’ decision to file for bankruptcy in Delaware rather than elsewhere, as if the two are completely 
interchangeable.”); David A. Skeel, Jr., Lockups and Delaware Venue in Corporate Law and 
Bankruptcy, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1243, 1277 (2000) (“[LoPucki’s] argument that a federal framework 
cannot be subject to local variation is in some respects the most puzzling, as it seems to assume a 
hyper-formalist definition of law.”).  But I have found no party criticizing the data found in the BRD.  
My empirical study relied on the data found in the BRD, along with the data I collected to reach my 
own independent conclusions. 
63 LOPUCKI, supra note 52, at xi; see also Contents of the BRD, UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKR. 
RESEARCH DATABASE, http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/contents_of_the_webbrd.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 
2013).  The BRD recognizes a company as “public” if it was required to file annual reports with the 
SEC in any of the three years before filing a bankruptcy petition.  LOPUCKI, supra note 52, at xi.  Note 
that the cases included in the BRD are not a mere sample of bankruptcy cases filed in the United States.  
Id. 
64 Frequently Asked Questions, UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKR. RESEARCH DATABASE, 
http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/Frequently_asked_questions.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2013). 
65 See Glossary, UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKR. RESEARCH DATABASE, 
http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/glossary.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2013) (describing the BRD’s definition 
of forum shopping). 
66 A number of debtors filed two qualifying bankruptcy cases.  In these instances, both cases were 
counted.  For example, Movie Gallery, Inc. filed a bankruptcy case in 2007 and emerged from 
bankruptcy in 2008.  Movie Gallery filed another bankruptcy case in 2010.  Jonathan Stempel, Movie 
Gallery Files Bankruptcy to Shut 805 Stores, REUTERS (Feb. 3, 
2010), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/03/us-moviegallery-idUSTRE61232U20100203.  The 
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approximately $1.2 billion or more in assets (“Megacases”),67 and (ii) that 
filed a bankruptcy petition under chapter 11 between January 1, 2007 and 
June 30, 2012. 
Further, for the 159 corporate debtors in my study group, I also 
independently reviewed these debtors’ bankruptcy petitions and first-day 
motions.  By doing so, I sought to accomplish two goals.  One, I sought to 
provide additional certainty to any forum-shopping determination that had 
been made by the BRD.  But, more importantly, I also sought to compile 
meaningful data regarding the primary bases on which forum shoppers 
relied.  In my research, I was unable to find any previous attempt to collect 
and classify this type of data.  In effect, I was attempting to isolate the 
means of forum shopping.  To accomplish this, I started by reviewing the 
bankruptcy petition for each debtor in the study group. 
A bankruptcy petition compels a debtor to provide insight into its 
venue choice.  As detailed in Part IV, the bankruptcy venue rules arguably 
provide four primary bases for establishing venue in a district: (1) the 
debtor’s principal assets in the United States are located in the district; (2) 
the debtor’s principal place of business in the United States is located in 
the district; (3) the debtor is incorporated in the state in which the district is 
found; or (4) a case concerning an affiliate of the debtor is pending in the 
district.  In filling out its bankruptcy petition, a corporate debtor must 
check at least one of three boxes to disclose the basis for its venue choice.  
The first box groups three of the four bases listed above and provides that 
the chosen district is proper based on the debtor’s domicile, residence, 
principal place of business, or principal assets.68  The second box provides 
that the chosen district is proper because there is a pending case of the 
debtor’s affiliate, general partner, or partnership in the same district.69  The 
third box involves foreign proceedings.70 
To the extent that a corporate debtor in my study group had checked 
the first box, I reviewed its first-day motions to determine whether the 
basis was: (i) state of incorporation; (ii) location of principal place of 
business; or (iii) location of principal assets.  I recorded this information, 
and it helped me determine on which bases forum shoppers were most 
frequently relying. 
If the debtor had based its venue choice on its state of incorporation, I 
                                                                                                                          
cases were counted as separate cases for purposes of this study.  See infra notes 315–16 and 
accompanying data. 
67 The BRD captures all cases filed by or against public companies that reported assets of $500 
million or more (measured in 1980 dollars; just over $1.2 billion in 2007 dollars) on the last form 10-K 
that the debtor filed with the SEC before filing the bankruptcy case. 
68 U.S. BANKR. COURT, FORM B1, at 2 (2013), available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/BK_Forms_Current/B_001.pdf. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. 
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reviewed the debtor’s bankruptcy filings to determine whether the debtor 
had any other meaningful connection to the state of incorporation, through 
either its business holdings or operations.  If there was none, I deemed that 
debtor to have forum shopped. 
If the debtor had based its venue choice on the location of its principal 
place of business, I evaluated whether the debtor’s purported principal 
place of business was really its headquarters and whether the headquarters 
had conveniently been moved at any point during the 6 months prior to the 
bankruptcy filing in order to secure venue in a particular district.  If either 
of these factors existed without an accompanying business justification, the 
debtor was deemed to have forum shopped. 
If the debtor had based its venue choice on the location of its principal 
assets, I evaluated what those assets were, the value of the assets in relation 
to the value of assets the debtor held in different districts, and how long 
those assets had been located in the district.  A debtor was deemed to have 
forum shopped when the assets upon which a debtor relied in securing 
venue were merely bank accounts and (i) the debtor had no other 
meaningful connection to the district; and (ii) other considerable assets 
were located in another district.  Further, a debtor was deemed to have 
forum shopped if the assets, regardless of type, located in the selected 
venue were significantly less valuable than the assets located in another 
district.71 
Finally, to the extent that a corporate debtor had selected the second 
box, which indicated an affiliate filing, I reviewed its first-day motions to 
understand the timeline of its filing.  It is important to keep in mind that the 
fact that the debtor files in the same district in which an affiliate’s 
bankruptcy case is already pending does not necessarily mean that the 
debtor is forum shopping.  In some cases, only the most troubled company 
in a corporate family files for bankruptcy.  But in subsequent months or 
years, the rest of the enterprise is forced to follow suit.  The value in 
adjudicating all these cases before the same court is clear and 
uncontroversial.  Yet most cases that rely on an affiliate filing hook to 
secure venue do involve forum shopping.  Two criteria facilitate 
differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate reliance on an affiliate 
filing hook: (1) the value of the affiliate’s assets in comparison to the 
debtor’s assets; and (2) the timing of the two filings. 
                                                                                                                          
71 In attributing value, I used both a qualitative and quantitative evaluation approach.  I reviewed 
the stated value of the assets in question as well as the perceived importance these assets had to the 
debtor’s business and rehabilitation prospects.  For example, if the corporate debtor in question was a 
casino operator, a vacant lot with a high market value would be deemed less qualitatively important to 
the debtor than its flagship casino, even to the extent that the market value of the land was considered 
to be higher than the casino.  However, my quantitative evaluation would properly weigh the market 
value of the land if it was considerably greater than that of the casino. 
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In the vast majority of cases where corporate debtors are seeking to 
forum shop in reliance on an affiliate filing hook, the affiliate’s assets are 
minuscule in comparison to the debtor’s—the tail is essentially wagging 
the dog.  The other indicator of forum shopping is that the corporate debtor 
filed its bankruptcy case hours, sometimes minutes, after its affiliate 
filed.72  I deemed cases in which both of these criteria existed to be the 
product of forum shopping.  Invariably, the primary corporate debtor could 
not secure the venue it sought based on § 1408’s other venue bases and did 
not wish to file in a natural forum.  The debtor, therefore, located a 
subsidiary that could secure the desired venue.  All the necessary 
bankruptcy filing work was done for the entire corporate family, but the 
subsidiary was filed first to secure venue, and then the rest of the 
companies were filed. 
My extensive research and analysis, along with information available 
through the BRD, allowed me to determine which of the 159 cases in my 
study group had forum shopped and on which basis they had relied.  The 
results were surprising. 
B.  The Results 
The forum shopping phenomenon that Professors LoPucki and 
Whitford exposed in 1991 was amplified during the Great Recession.  My 
analysis of the BRD data reveals that from 1991 to 1996, 55% of 
Megacases had forum shopped.73  From 2007 to 2012, 69% of Megacases 
had forum shopped.74  Further, the absolute number of cases of forum 
shopping increased.  There were eighty-eight Megacases from 1991 to 
1996 and forty-eight of those corporate debtors forum shopped.75  From 
2007 to 2012, there were 159 Megacases and 110 of those corporate 
debtors forum shopped.76  Consequently, between these two periods, the 
                                                                                                                          
72 A good example is In re Station Casinos, Inc., No. BK-09-52477 (Bankr. D. Nev. Dec. 21, 
2011), which I will speak to from my first-hand experience.  In that case, the primary debtor entities 
owned casinos valued at over a billion dollars.  But the debtor’s subsidiary, Northern NV Acquisitions, 
LLC, filed first.  The subsidiary owned only a small parcel of land in Reno, but this asset was sufficient 
to secure venue in the Northern Division of Nevada.  Within a matter of minutes after the Northern NV 
Acquisition’s filing, the primary debtor entities were filed based on an affiliate’s pending case.  This 
mechanism allowed the debtor to avoid filing in its natural forum, the Southern Division of Nevada, 
which has bankruptcy judges that some corporate debtors view unfavorably. 
73 See UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKR. RESEARCH DATABASE, supra note 62 (resulting data and notes on 
file with author). 
74 See infra Appendix (showing that 110 of the 159 corporate debtors in my study group had 
forum shopped).   
75 UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKR. RESEARCH DATABASE, supra note 62 (data and notes on file with 
author). 
76 See infra Appendix.  As noted earlier, the BRD attempts to equalize the valuation of 
bankruptcy cases by converting all asset figures into 1980 dollars.  See supra note 67.  So a 1991 
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frequency with which Megacases forum shopped grew at a statistically 
significant rate (14%), and the absolute number of Megacases that forum 
shopped grew at a staggering rate (130%). 
For the cases filed from 1991 to 1996, the average number of 
employees for each debtor that forum shopped was approximately 6,500.77  
For the cases filed from 2007 to 2012, the average number of employees 
for each debtor that forum shopped was approximately 9,400—a 45% 
increase.78  This data establishes that during the Great Recession, 
significantly more corporations with far more employees filed for 
bankruptcy and, of those corporations, nearly seven out of ten forum 
shopped.  As the size of these cases increases, so do the liabilities, the 
number of creditors affected, and the collective exposure of the secured 
and unsecured creditor bodies.   Thus, there are far more parties affected by 
the large-asset bankruptcy cases filed during the Great Recession and the 
forum shopping in which these corporate debtors engaged. 
In addition, as demonstrated in Figure 1 below, the data I 
independently gathered provides deeper insight into the basis on which 
these debtors relied in filing in their selected venue.   
FIGURE 1 
PORTION OF CORPORATE DEBTORS WHO FORUM SHOPPED 
(BY VENUE BASIS) 79 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
bankruptcy case with a reported asset valuation of $900 million would qualify as a “Megacase” for 
purposes of my study, but a 2007 case with the same asset valuation would not. 
77 UCLA-LOPUCKI BANKR. RESEARCH DATABASE, supra note 62 (data and notes on file with 
author). 
78 See infra Appendix.   
79 See infra Appendix (listing individual pieces of supporting case data). 
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As discussed, there are four independent bases for filing a bankruptcy 
petition in a given district.80  Figure 1 shows that 114 of the 159 corporate 
debtors in my study group checked the box on their bankruptcy petition 
indicating that they were filing in the district of their incorporation or the 
location of their principal business or assets.  However, only five of these 
debtors relied on the location of their principal assets, and all of them 
forum shopped.  Fifty-six of the 159 corporate debtors in my study group 
(35%) relied on the location of their principal place of business to establish 
venue, and eight of them (15%) forum shopped.  Fifty-three of the 159 
corporate debtors in my study group (33%) relied on their state of 
incorporation in securing venue.  All fifty-three of these corporate debtors 
forum shopped, and fifty of them (94%) filed in Delaware.81  The 
remaining forty-five corporate debtors of the 159 corporate debtors in my 
study group (28%) relied on an affiliate filing hook, and forty-four of those 
forty-five corporate debtors forum shopped.  Thirty-six of those forty-four 
debtors (82%) filed in either Delaware or the Southern District of New 
York.82 
Therefore, 97 of the 98 corporate debtors that relied on their state of 
incorporation or the affiliate filing hook (the “Forum Shopping Bases”) to 
establish venue had forum shopped and, of this group, almost nine out of 
ten forum shopped to either Delaware or the Southern District of New 
York.83  Further, by stepping back and looking at all 110 forum shoppers in 
my study group, we see that nearly nine out of ten forum shoppers relied 
on one of the two Forum Shopping Bases to forum shop.84  Additionally, 
out of all forum shoppers in my study group, eight out of ten filed in either 
Delaware or the Southern District of New York.85  Ultimately, the two 
Forum Shopping Bases overwhelmingly provide the means by which 
parties are forum shopping (see Figure 2 below), and Delaware and the 
Southern District of New York are the courts where these forum shoppers 
are invariably landing (see Figure 3 below). 
                                                                                                                          
80 See supra text accompanying note 68. 
81 See infra Appendix (identifying the district where each case was filed). 
82 See infra Appendix (noting that eight filed in Delaware and twenty-eight filed in the Southern 
District of New York). 
83 See infra Appendix (showing that eighty-six of the 97 forum shoppers in my study group (89%) 
relied on either the state of incorporation venue basis or the affiliating filing hook filed in either 
Delaware or the Southern District of New York).  
84 See infra Appendix (showing that ninety-seven of the 110 forum shoppers in my study group 
(88%) relied on either the state of incorporation venue basis or the affiliate filing hook to forum shop). 
85 See infra Appendix (showing that ninety-one of the 110 forum shoppers in my study group 
(82%) filed in either Delaware or the Southern District of New York). 
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FIGURE 2  
BASIS ON WHICH FORUM SHOPPERS RELIED86 
(n = 110) 
 
FIGURE 3 
TOP NINE VENUES FOR FORUM SHOPPERS87 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
86 See infra Appendix. 
87 See infra Appendix. 
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Finally, 100 of the 159 cases in my study group (63%) filed in either 
Delaware or the Southern District of New York.88  Even putting aside the 
forum shopping issue, the fact that these many Megacases are 
accumulating in just two courts indicates some sort of market irregularity.  
Indeed, all bankruptcy courts are governed by the same federal law.89  
Naturally, case law can vary from circuit to circuit depending on precedent 
in a particular circuit and local rules, but key decision makers reacting to 
case law would conceivably lead to the accumulation of cases in a 
particular circuit, not in a particular court.90   
The data indicate a market failure.  The phenomenon Professors 
LoPucki and Whitford identified in 1991 continues to plague the 
bankruptcy system. 
IV.  HOW CORPORATE DEBTORS USE THE PERMISSIVE 
VENUE RULES TO FORUM SHOP 
Section 1408 in title 28 of the United States Code provides the venue 
rules for bankruptcy cases filed under title 11.91  The section allows 
individual and business entities to commence a bankruptcy case in the 
district court for the district: 
(1) in which the domicile, residence, principal place of 
business in the United States, or principal assets in the United 
States, of the person or entity that is the subject of such case 
have been located for the one hundred and eighty days 
immediately preceding such commencement, or for a longer 
portion of such one-hundred-and-eighty-day period than the 
domicile, residence, or principal place of business, in the 
United States, or principal assets in the United States, of such 
person were located in any other district; or  
(2) in which there is pending a case under title 11 concerning 
such person’s affiliate, general partner, or partnership.92 
For a corporate debtor, § 1408 arguably provides four primary bases 
for establishing venue in a district: (1) the debtor’s principal place of 
business in the United States is in the district; (2) the debtor’s principal 
assets in the United States are located in the district; (3) the debtor is 
                                                                                                                          
88 See infra Appendix. 
89 LOPUCKI, supra note 52, at 77.  Some variance exists based on local rules and other court-
specific procedures.  Id. at 77–78. 
90 Id. 
91 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006).  Cases 
ancillary to foreign bankruptcy proceedings are filed under chapter 15 of title 11 and governed by 
§ 1410’s venue rules.  Id. § 1410. 
92 Id. § 1408.   
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incorporated in the state in which the district is found;93 or (4) a case 
concerning an affiliate of the debtor is pending in the district. 
A.  Principal Place of Business 
In establishing venue, fifty-six of the 159 corporate debtors in my 
study group (35%) relied on their principal place of business; eight of them 
forum shopped.94  The corporate debtors in my study group utilized this 
basis for establishing venue more than any other, but only 14% of them 
relied on this basis to forum shop.95 
The location of a debtor’s principal place of business is a question of 
objective fact, not subjective intention, to be resolved after considering 
relevant aspects of the debtor’s operations.96  The overarching question 
involves where the debtor, in the aggregate, manages and initiates its 
business.97  Two primary tests are used to answer this question.  The 
“nerve center” test advocates a more limited inquiry,98 and instructs courts 
to look to the place where the debtor’s “major, business management 
decisions are made.  Under [this test], wherever the debtor’s primary 
decision-makers are congregated will be the principal place of business.”99  
In other words, the corporate headquarters and offices are invariably the 
principal place of business.100  The “operational” test probes further.101  
This test evaluates the debtor’s day-to-day operations, considering not just 
where major business management decisions are made but also the location 
of: (i) the debtor’s books, records, accounting, and other management 
information; (ii) personnel, equipment, and assets; (iii) income generating 
activities and where debts were incurred; (iv) bank accounts; and (v) day-
                                                                                                                          
93 Many states have multiple districts in which a debtor can file.  Geographic Boundaries of the 
United States Court of Appeals and United States District Courts, USCOURTS.GOV, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/images/CircuitMap.pdf (last visited Aug. 30, 2013).  For instance, 
California has four districts and multiple bankruptcy courts within each district.  California Bankruptcy 
Court Directory, CALIFORNIABANKRUPTCY.INFO, http://www.californiabankruptcy.info/court.html 
(last visited Aug. 30, 2013).  Thus, under § 1408, a debtor incorporated in California can file in any one 
of the four districts based on its place of incorporation. 
94 See supra Figure 1. 
95 Id. 
96 E.g., In re Peachtree Lane Assocs., Ltd., 150 F.3d 788, 795 (7th Cir. 1998) (“[T]he principal 
place of business inquiry is primarily a factual one.”); In re Condor Exploration, LLC, 294 B.R. 370, 
374 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003) (“[W]hat constitutes the principal place of business of a corporation is a 
question of objective fact, not subjective intention.”). 
97 See, e.g., In re Peachtree Lane, 150 F.3d at 795 (arguing the principal place of business “is 
likely to be the place where its management decisions are made”); In re Condor Exploration, 294 B.R. 
at 374 (providing factors to determine an entity’s principal place of business). 
98 In re Condor Exploration, 294 B.R. at 374. 
99 Id. (citing In re Peachtree Lane, 150 F.3d at 788). 
100 Id. 
101 Id. 
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to-day activities.102 
The Supreme Court recently shed some light on the debate between 
these two tests.  In Hertz Corp. v. Friend,103 the Court sought to resolve a 
circuit split concerning the meaning of the phrase “principal place of 
business” provided in 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) for purposes of determining 
whether federal diversity jurisdiction exists.104  Some courts had employed 
the nerve center test, focusing on the place from which a corporation’s 
officers direct the corporation’s activities.105  The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, along with other courts, had adopted the more complex “business 
activity” or operational test that focused on the place where the greater 
share of a corporation’s executive and administrative functions are 
performed.106  The Court resolved the split in favor of the nerve center test, 
a choice that the Court believed would engender greater administrative 
simplicity.107  Indeed, the Court explained that the “[principal place of 
business] should normally be the place where the corporation maintains its 
headquarters—provided that the headquarters is the actual center of 
direction, control, and coordination . . . and not simply an office where the 
corporation holds its board meetings.”108  The Court found that the 
operational test was too complex and forced judges to consider a variety of 
criteria and “weigh corporate functions, assets and revenues different in 
kind, one from the other.”109  The Court concluded that the test led to 
inconclusive decisions—needlessly complicating cases, fostering disputes 
and appeals, eating up time and money, and ultimately diminishing “the 
likelihood that results and settlements [would] reflect a claim’s legal and 
factual merits.”110  The Court believed that the nerve center test would 
“point[] courts in a single direction, towards the center of overall direction, 
control, and coordination[, making it] a sensible test that [would be] 
relatively easier to apply.”111 
The Hertz ruling does not foreclose discussion on the definition of the 
principal place of business.  Courts prior to the Hertz ruling noted that 
differing policy considerations suggest that “tests for a corporation’s 
principal place of business in diversity cases should not be imported 
wholesale into bankruptcy venue law.”112  Nevertheless, notwithstanding 
                                                                                                                          
102 Id.; In re Dock of the Bay, Inc., 24 B.R. 811, 815 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982). 
103 559 U.S. 77 (2010). 
104 Id. at 80. 
105 Id. at 80–81. 
106 Id. (citing Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env’t, 236 F.3d 495, 500–02 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
107 Id. at 92–93. 
108 Id.  
109 Id. at 90–92, 96.   
110 Id. at 94.  
111 Id. at 95–96. 
112 In re Peachtree Lane Assocs., Ltd., 206 B.R. 913, 922 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (7th Cir. 1998) (citing 
In re Commonwealth Oil Refining Co., 596 F.2d 1239, 1247 n.17 (5th Cir. 1979)), aff’d, 150 F.3d 788.  
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the differing policy objectives between § 1332 and § 1408, the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of “principal place of business” in § 1332 must 
inform any interpretation of the identical phrase in § 1408.113  The Hertz 
ruling, for all intents and purposes, mandates the nerve center test in 
evaluating a corporation’s principal place of business.  This means that 
corporate defendants have less flexibility in arguing diversity under  
§ 1332, and corporate debtors have slightly less flexibility in attempting to 
justify their choice of venue under § 1408. 
B.  Principal Assets 
Of the four primary venue bases, the location of a corporate debtor’s 
principal assets is invoked the least.  While only five of the 159 corporate 
debtors in my study group (3%) relied on the location of their principal 
assets in establishing venue, all five forum shopped.114 
The term “assets” is undefined in the Bankruptcy Code but has been 
interpreted broadly115 to include not only manufacturing facilities, 
inventory, and equipment, but also rights under a lease or sublease, shares 
of stock, accounts receivable, net operating losses, and pending lawsuits, 
inter alia.116  In evaluating this basis for venue, courts will be considering 
those assets that are principally used in the operation of the debtor’s 
business.117  To be considered, the assets must be related to business in 
which the debtor is engaged.118  Bankruptcy courts will generally engage in 
                                                                                                                          
Note that § 1332 and § 1408 have differing policy objectives.  Diversity jurisdiction was designed to 
“provide a separate forum for out-of-state citizens against the prejudices of local courts and local juries 
by making available to them the benefits and safeguards of Federal courts.”  S. REP. NO. 85-1830, at 4 
(1958).  Supreme Court precedent in this area has often sought to limit a corporation’s ability to 
manufacture diversity and improperly remove cases to federal court.  The language of § 1408 serves 
not to protect debtors from local courts and local juries, but to allow flexibility in choosing venue.  The 
policy concerns guiding these two sections have “little or nothing in common.”  In re Commonwealth 
Oil, 596 F.2d at 1247 n.17. 
113 See In re Lakota Canyon Ranch Dev., LLC., No. 11-03739-8-RDD, 2011 WL 5909630, at *1 
(Bankr. E.D.N.C. June 21, 2011) (citing the Hertz ruling and adopting the nerve center test in 
determining principal place of business), as amended (June 23, 2011); In re W. Coast Interventional 
Pain Med., Inc., 435 B.R. 569, 575 n.2 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 2010) (same). 
114 See supra Figure 1. 
115 See 11 U.S.C. § 541 (2012) (defining property of the estate as “all legal or equitable interests 
of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the case”).   
116 See In re Prudential Lines, Inc., 928 F.2d 565, 569 (2d Cir. 1991) (including net operating 
losses as part of bankruptcy property); In re Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publ’g Co., 474 B.R. 122, 
135–36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) (including rights under a lease as bankruptcy assets); In re J & L 
Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 186 B.R. 388, 390 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1995) (including accounts receivable as 
bankruptcy assets). 
117 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 9, at 19 (describing how companies will move their 
headquarters in order to obtain a favorable venue). 
118 See In re Newport Creamery, Inc., 265 B.R. 614, 616 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 2001) (stating that in 
order to establish proper venue, the principal place of business or principal assets must be in the 
district). 
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a quantitative and qualitative analysis.119  A quantitative analysis requires 
that a court consider the dollar value of the assets in relation to value of the 
debtor’s overall portfolio of assets.120  A qualitative analysis requires that a 
court consider the importance of the assets to the debtor’s operations and 
reorganization prospects.121  Only one district can qualify as the place 
where a company’s principal assets are located.122  Therefore, the 
bankruptcy courts will often have to compare the assets located in one 
district with those located in another.123 
Not coincidentally, this criterion also tends to be the one that is the 
most difficult to manipulate.  Large corporations invariably have assets 
located in a variety of districts; moving or selling a portion of these assets 
in order to establish venue in a given district could be difficult and 
unnecessary considering the other venue bases available.  That being said, 
because of the broad reading of the term “assets,” this basis affords 
corporations with less fixed assets significant flexibility. 
C.  Place of Incorporation and the Unresolved Quandary 
1.  The State-of-Incorporation Venue Basis Affords Corporate Debtors 
Significant Flexibility 
A corporate debtor’s place of incorporation represents a venue basis 
that is both frequently used and facilitates forum shopping.  One-third of 
the corporate debtors in my study group relied on this basis, and all fifty-
three forum shopped.124  Further, these fifty-three forum shoppers represent 
almost half of the total number of forum shoppers in my study group. 
Section 1408 of title 28 provides that a “person” can rely on domicile 
or residence in selecting venue.125  Section 1 of title 1 of the United States 
Code defines the term “person” to include natural persons as well as 
fictitious business entities, such as partnerships and corporations.126  A 
natural person can clearly have a domicile and a residence.  “Residence” is 
generally where someone is living.  “Domicile” is generally understood to 
                                                                                                                          
119 See In re Houghton Mifflin, 474 B.R. at 136 (using both quantitative and qualitative analyses). 
120 See id. at 135–36 (emphasizing the importance of properly identifying a debtor company’s 
principal assets, to allow for a useful numerical comparison with the company’s overall assets). 
121 Id. at 136.  
122 See LoPucki & Whitford, supra note 9, at 17 (stating a debtor can only have one principal 
place of business at any given time). 
123 See In re Houghton Mifflin, 474 B.R. at 136 (determining whether venue was appropriate by 
comparing the assets of the holding company to those of its subsidiaries that were within different 
districts). 
124 See supra Part III.B. 
125 11 U.S.C § 1408 (2012). 
126 See 1 U.S.C. § 1 (2012) (“[T]he words ‘person’ and ‘whoever’ include corporations, 
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and joint stock companies, as well as 
individuals.”) 
 186 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:159 
refer to the place where one resides coupled with the intention to remain; 
the term can also refer to the place where one intends to return.127 
However, the language of § 1408 indicates that these terms can also 
conceivably apply to a corporate debtor.  Though it is unclear how a 
corporation could have a “domicile” or “residence” aside from its 
corporate headquarters or location of principal assets, many courts assume 
that a corporation’s domicile is its state of incorporation.128  In these 
jurisdictions, corporate debtors have immense flexibility.  A corporation’s 
state of incorporation can be changed relatively easily.129  Changing a 
corporation’s state of incorporation to secure venue may be worthwhile in 
cases involving a limited number of high-stakes issues in which the court 
before which the bankruptcy case is tried may be dispositive.  Furthermore, 
a corporate debtor is generally seen as having the right to file in any district 
located within its state of incorporation.  Consequently, this basis for venue 
is allowing forum shopping not only among circuits and states but also 
among districts within the same state. 
The only real constraint on a corporate debtor relying on its state of 
incorporation is that it must have been incorporated in the state of its 
bankruptcy case for the 180 days immediately preceding its filing or, in the 
alternative, the longer portion of such a period.130  But considering that the 
vast majority of Megacases involve months and sometimes years of pre-
bankruptcy negotiations, the 180-day look-back period poses a minor 
obstacle. 
2.  Questionable Assumptions Regarding the Meaning of “Domicile” 
The premise that a corporate debtor can rely on its state of 
incorporation as a basis for venue is virtually unquestioned.  But the 
foundation for this practice is unclear.  As noted above, Congress 
originated this approach in the 1898 Bankruptcy Act.  The act grouped 
together all debtors, whether they were natural persons or fictitious 
business entities, and afforded the same bases for establishing venue to 
each.  In drafting this legislation, Congress overlooked the fact that while 
                                                                                                                          
127 In re Donald, 328 B.R. 192, 202 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2005). 
128 See, e.g., In re EB Capital Mgmt. LLC, No. 11-12646(MG), 2011 WL 2838115, at *3 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2011) (“A corporation’s domicile is generally held to be its state of incorporation.”); 
In re Dunmore Homes, Inc., 380 B.R. 663, 670 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (stating a corporation’s 
domicile is its state of incorporation); In re Innovative Commc’n Co., LLC, 358 B.R. 120, 125 (Bankr. 
D. Del. 2006) (“Venue is appropriate in the state of incorporation.”); In re FRG, Inc., 107 B.R. 461, 
471 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (“[A] corporation’s domicile is generally held to be its state of 
incorporation.”); In re Del. & Hudson Ry. Co., 96 B.R. 467 (Bankr. D. Del. 1988) (finding Delaware to 
be a proper venue since the debtor was incorporated in that state). 
129 See, e.g., Alison Torbitt, Implementing Corporate Climate Change Responsibility: Possible 
State Legislative and SEC Responses to Climate Change Through Corporate Law Reform, 88 OR. L. 
REV. 581, 595 (2009) (stating a business can easily change its state of incorporation). 
130 28 U.S.C. § 1408 (2006).  
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the terms “domicile” and “residence” clearly applied to natural persons, the 
application to corporate debtors was unorthodox. 
The judiciary was tasked with handling this oversight.  Many courts 
ruled that a corporation’s “domicile” indicated its state of incorporation, 
implicitly finding that the term “residence” could not apply to a corporate 
debtor and certain language in the section could be disregarded to the 
extent it compelled such a result.131  As noted above, in 1938, Congress 
ultimately rejected this approach for corporate debtors that had publicly 
held securities or debt.  Based on the National Bankruptcy Conference’s 
clear policy rationale, Congress limited venue for such corporate debtors to 
the location of their principal place of business or principal assets.132  In 
1973, the judiciary fully endorsed this approach.133 
Nevertheless, unfortunate drafting decisions plagued § 1408 and 
§ 1475, its predecessor, and Congress reincarnated the same troublesome 
venue problem to which it had given birth in 1898.  While the decision to 
reintroduce the terms “domicile” and “residence” to corporate debtors may 
have been a gross oversight, it represents only the first step.  As noted 
above, at the time the current venue rules were enacted, venue provisions 
had not been abused.  Legislators and academics had uniformly overlooked 
the potential for abuse created by the changes to the rules.  But this 
potential was first realized by a 1988 Delaware bankruptcy court ruling.134 
In 1988, the Delaware and Hudson Railway Company filed a chapter 
11 bankruptcy petition in Delaware Bankruptcy Court.135  The company’s 
corporate headquarters and virtually all of its assets were in Albany, which 
was located in the area governed by the Northern District of New York 
Bankruptcy Court.136  The company had essentially no connection to 
                                                                                                                          
131 See, e.g., In re Pilgrim Plumbing Supply Corp., 123 F. Supp. 823, 824 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (“[I]t 
is clear that a corporation has its domicile in the place where it is incorporated.”); In re Triton Chem. 
Corp., 46 F. Supp. 326, 328 n.1 (D. Del. 1942) (“As both alleged bankrupts are Delaware corporations, 
they are ‘domiciled’ in this district.”); In re R.C. Stanley Shoe Co., 8 F. Supp. 681, 683 (D.N.H. 1934) 
(“[A] corporation may be organized under the laws of one state and have its principal place of business 
in another state and there be jurisdiction in both states to adjudge the corporation a bankrupt.”). 
132 See supra Part II.B. 
133 See supra Part II.B.  
134 Some courts reached the same conclusion before Delaware did.  The court in In re HME 
Records, Inc., 62 B.R. 611, 613 n.3 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986), indicated in dicta that state of 
incorporation could serve as a basis for venue.  The bankruptcy court in In re Spicer Oaks Apartments, 
Ltd., 80 B.R. 142, 143 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. 1987), also stated in dicta that state of incorporation could 
serve as a basis for venue.  The court in In re Coalfield Development, Inc., 56 B.R. 201, 203 (Bankr. 
W.D. Va. 1986), considered the debtor’s state of incorporation in evaluating the principal-place-of-
business prong under the venue rules.  And the bankruptcy court in In re Community Churches of 
America, 57 B.R. 562, 564 n.2 (Bankr. D.D.C. 1986), stated unequivocally that a corporation’s 
domicile is its state of incorporation.  These rulings were far less impactful since relatively few large 
corporate debtors are incorporated in these states as compared to Delaware. 
135 In re Del. & Hudson Ry. Co., 96 B.R. 467, 467 (Bankr. D. Del. 1988). 
136 Id. 
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Delaware aside from the fact that it was incorporated there.137  The New 
York State Department of Transportation sought to transfer the case to 
New York.138  Delaware Bankruptcy Court Judge Helen S. Balick denied 
the request, stating that venue in Delaware was appropriate because the 
debtor was incorporated in that state.139  Surprisingly, Judge Balick 
provided absolutely no rationale or explanation for her interpretation of 
§ 1408.  The opinion does not even explain whether a corporate debtor’s 
state of incorporation is considered under the “domicile” or “residence” 
prong or perhaps some other basis.140  Judge Balick’s opinion promotes 
this basis for venue as an uncontroversial option; an axiomatic practice 
without need for citation.  Judge Balick reiterated her interpretation of 
§ 1408 just two months later in In re Ocean Properties of Delaware, Inc.141  
Again, she offered no explanation or rationale for her reading of the 
section.142 
These two rulings, along with rulings in other jurisdictions,143 offer an 
interpretation of § 1408 that is unsupported by legislative history or the 
language of the statute.144  The only explanation for this interpretation 
                                                                                                                          
137 See id. at 468 (describing the debtor’s assets, the majority of which were not connected with 
Delaware). 
138 Id. at 467.  
139 Id. at 467, 469.  
140 This is just one of the many flaws in the opinion.  For example, despite the debtor’s 
overwhelming connections to New York, Judge Balick denied the transfer motion, ruling that the 
debtor’s choice of forum was entitled to “great weight,” and that Delaware would be “most convenient 
from the standpoint of accessibility” for some of the constituents in the case.  Id. at 467–68.  In making 
a decision on a motion for a change of venue, courts generally examine the following factors:  “(1) the 
location of the debtors’ estate; (2) the economic and efficient administration of the debtors’ estate; (3) 
the proximity of the debtors; (4) the proximity of the creditors; (5) the proximity of the witnesses . . . .”  
In re Old Delmar Corp., 45 B.R. 883, 884 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).  Judge Balick’s decision to allow the 
perceived accessibility of the Delaware court to trump all other factors is extraordinary.  Further, Judge 
Balick fails to provide any explanation or citation for her belief that the debtor’s choice of venue is 
entitled to “great weight.” 
141 95 B.R. 304, 305 (Bankr. D. Del. 1988). 
142 From a purely economic perspective, Judge Balick’s interpretation was practically 
preordained.  Indeed, 89% of the large public companies that filed for bankruptcy reorganization from 
1980 to 1997 were incorporated or had a subsidiary that was incorporated in Delaware.  Eisenberg & 
LoPucki, supra note 60, at 985.  Judge Balick’s ruling allowed all of these debtors to file in Delaware.  
A contrary ruling would have precluded essentially all of these debtors from doing so.  In light of the 
amount of revenues large bankruptcy cases infuse into local communities, such a ruling would have 
been clearly against the interests of the Delaware legal and business communities. 
143 See, e.g., In re EB Capital Mgmt. LLC, No. 11-12646(MG), 2011 WL 2838115, at *3 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. July 14, 2011) (finding a corporation to be domiciled in its state of incorporation); In re 
Dunmore Homes, Inc., 380 B.R. 663, 670 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (recognizing that a corporation’s 
state of incorporation is proper for venue); In re Innovative Commc’n Co., LLC, 358 B.R. 120, 125 
(Bankr. D. Del. 2006) (“Venue is appropriate in the state of incorporation.”); In re FRG, Inc., 107 B.R. 
461, 471 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating a corporation is domiciled in its state of incorporation). 
144 Note that § 304 of the 1984 Bankruptcy Code dealt with the recognition of foreign bankruptcy 
proceedings by U.S. bankruptcy courts.  11 U.S.C. § 304 (repealed 2005).  The section contained 
language similar to § 1408 and appeared to apply the term “domicile” to corporate entities.  The section 
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requires analogizing to extremely old jurisdiction cases.  Indeed, courts 
interpreting the 1898 Bankruptcy Act’s confusing venue provisions relied 
on two Supreme Court cases in finding that a corporation could have a 
domicile.  In the first case, Bank v. Earle,145 the Court was faced with the 
question whether a corporation chartered in one state could be legally 
bound by a contract entered into in another state.146  The Court held that a 
corporation could be legally bound by a contract entered into in a state in 
which it was not chartered.147  In dicta, the Court stated that “[i]t is very 
true that a corporation can have no legal existence out of the boundaries of 
the sovereignty by which it is created . . . .  It must dwell in the place of its 
creation, and cannot migrate to another sovereignty.”148  The support that 
this dicta provides for a finding that “domicile” equates to a corporate 
debtor’s state of incorporation is unclear. 
The second case, Shaw v. Quincy Mining Co.,149 involved the question 
of federal diversity jurisdiction and required the Court to determine 
whether a corporation chartered under Michigan law but doing business in 
New York was present in New York within the meaning of a diversity 
statute requiring suit to be brought in a state where the defendant was an 
“inhabitant” or was “found.”150  In holding that a corporation could be sued 
only in the state and district in which it was incorporated or in the state of 
which the other party is a citizen, the Court noted that the “legal existence, 
the home, the domicile, the habitat, the residence, the citizenship of the 
corporation can only be in the state by which it was created, although it 
may do business in other states whose laws permit it.”151  Once again, the 
efficacy of relying on dicta in a jurisdiction case from the nineteenth 
century is unclear. 
More recent opinions rely on these cases but also analogize to 
28 U.S.C. § 1391, the venue statute for civil litigation.152  There are two 
primary problems with this reference.  First, § 1391 explicitly provides that 
it applies only to a corporation that is a defendant in a civil action;153 this is 
clearly not the case in a bankruptcy proceeding.  Furthermore, § 1391 does 
not state that a corporation’s domicile is its state of incorporation.  Rather, 
                                                                                                                          
was drafted at the same time as § 1475, the predecessor to § 1408.  However, § 304 was repealed in 
2005, and the key provision was completely rewritten, removing the term “domicile” from the inquiry. 
145 38 U.S. 519 (1839). 
146 Id. at 585.  
147 Id. at 588–89. 
148 Id. at 588. 
149 145 U.S. 444 (1892). 
150 Id. at 447. 
151 Id. at 450. 
152 See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. S.F.C. Corp., 702 F.2d 282, 283 (1st Cir. 1983) (deciding the case on 
the issue of venue, and noting a corporate plaintiff is a resident only in the state in which it is 
incorporated for venue purposes). 
153 28 U.S.C. § 1391 (2006). 
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§ 1391 provides that for purposes of determining proper venue, a 
corporation’s “residence” is its state of incorporation.154  The section 
makes no mention of “domicile.”  As noted above, bankruptcy courts have 
uniformly agreed that the term “residence” does not apply to corporate 
debtors. 
The basis for finding that the term “domicile” applies to corporate 
debtors and indicates state of incorporation is questionable.  Even the most 
generous reading of the key opinions in this area fails to uncover 
persuasive arguments.  Not surprisingly, various courts have rejected 
Delaware’s interpretation of § 1408 and found that neither “domicile” nor 
“residence” can apply to a corporate debtor.155 
Ultimately, the issue is unresolved, but this fact has limited effect.  The 
Delaware courts allow corporate debtors to rely on their state of 
incorporation in establishing venue.  This decision facilitates forum 
shopping and is unaffected by the lack of consensus on whether the 
interpretation is justified. 
D.  Affiliate Filing 
The final basis for a corporate debtor’s venue choice is that one of the 
debtor’s “affiliates” has a pending case in the district.156  This basis and the 
                                                                                                                          
154 Section 1391 provides that a corporate defendant is deemed to reside in any judicial district in 
which the corporation is subject to the court’s personal jurisdiction—which has been interpreted to 
include the corporation’s state of incorporation.  E.g., VE Holding Corp. v. Johnson Gas Appliance 
Co., 917 F.2d 1574, 1577–79 (Fed. Cir. 1990). 
155 See In re Condor Exploration, LLC, 294 B.R. 370, 373 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003) (rejecting 
Delaware’s interpretation of § 1408); In re Indus. Pollution Control, Inc., 137 B.R. 176, 180 (Bankr. 
W.D. Pa. 1992) (same); In re Standard Tank Cleaning Corp., 133 B.R. 562, 563–64 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 
1991) (same); In re Suzanne de Lyon, Inc., 125 B.R. 863, 866 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1991) (same); see also 
In re EDP Med. Computer Sys., Inc., 178 B.R. 57, 62 (M.D. Pa. 1995) (acknowledging uncertainty 
regarding whether the terms “domicile” and “residence” apply to corporate debtors). 
156 See 28 U.S.C. § 1408(2) (2006) (stating that a title 11 case can be brought in a district “in 
which there is a pending case under title 11 concerning such person’s affiliate”).  Though not 
technically binding, § 101 of the Bankruptcy Code defines the term “affiliate” to mean:  
A) entity that directly or indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 
percent or more of the outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than an 
entity that holds such securities—(i) in a fiduciary or agency capacity without sole 
discretionary power to vote such securities; or  (ii) solely to secure a debt, if such 
entity has not in fact exercised such power to vote; (B) corporation 20 percent or 
more of whose outstanding voting securities are directly or indirectly owned, 
controlled, or held with power to vote, by the debtor, or by an entity that directly or 
indirectly owns, controls, or holds with power to vote, 20 percent or more of the 
outstanding voting securities of the debtor, other than an entity that holds such 
securities—(i) in a fiduciary or agency capacity without sole discretionary power to 
vote such securities; or (ii) solely to secure a debt, if such entity has not in fact 
exercised such power to vote; (C) person whose business is operated under a lease or 
operating agreement by a debtor, or person substantially all of whose property is 
operated under an operating agreement with the debtor; or (D) entity that operates 
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state-of-incorporation basis work together to facilitate forum shopping.  
Forty-five of the 159 corporate debtors in my study group (28%) relied on 
the affiliate filing hook.  Forty-four of the forty-five debtors forum 
shopped.  Further, 40% of the forum shoppers in my study group relied on 
this basis. 
Surprisingly, this venue basis was traditionally one of the least 
controversial provisions of the venue rules.  Without this basis for venue, 
various companies within the same corporate family could be forced to file 
for bankruptcy in different districts.  A wholesale adjudication of the 
corporate family’s bankruptcy cases would be virtually impossible.  There 
would be considerable waste of judicial resources, not to mention the 
financial and logistical burden on the debtor’s officers and legal counsel.  
The net result would be a significant reduction in any chance of a 
meaningful reorganization.  Notwithstanding this sound policy, § 1408(2)’s 
wording provides virtually no restrictions on an affiliate filing, and this has 
allowed for debtor gamesmanship. 
Today, § 1408(2) is used in a manner that bears no relation to the 
policy basis of the provision.  As noted in Part III.A, the most common 
method for abusing this provision is for the corporate debtor to locate a 
subsidiary that had been incorporated in a favorable district—a district in 
which the primary corporate debtor could not otherwise file its bankruptcy 
petition.  Legal counsel for the corporate debtor prepares the entire 
corporate family for bankruptcy.  But instead of filing the entire family 
together, legal counsel files the subsidiary’s petition in the favorable 
district first to establish venue.  Then, within a matter of minutes, the rest 
of the corporate family files their bankruptcy petitions in the same district 
on the premise that an affiliate’s bankruptcy case is pending in the district.  
Despite this obvious gamesmanship, none of the forty-four forum shopping 
cases I identified was transferred. 
Debtor gamesmanship can come in other permutations.  In some cases, 
a corporate family has no subsidiaries that are able to file in the desired 
district.  This is a rare circumstance—and was not present for any of the 
corporate debtors in my study group—but one that is easily circumvented 
because of the permissive language of § 1408(2).  In such a case, the 
company merely creates and incorporates a shell subsidiary in the 
favorable district and then follows the procedure outlined above.  The shell 
subsidiary has no employees or meaningful operations or assets, but the 
fact that it is incorporated in the favorable district is sufficient—even when 
the incorporation occurs in the days immediately before the bankruptcy 
                                                                                                                          
the business or substantially all of the property of the debtor under a lease or 
operating agreement. 
11 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).  
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filing.157  Once again, nothing in the venue rules restricts such blatant 
gamesmanship. 
E.  The Problem 
The controversy with the current venue rules is not that they allow 
corporate debtors to file in Delaware or New York, but rather that 
corporate debtors have the option of filing just about anywhere.  This 
flexibility creates a troubling dynamic.  To the extent that the bankruptcy 
judges in the magnet districts of Delaware and New York fall out of favor 
with the key decision makers, cases can easily start to accumulate in some 
other jurisdiction.  Megacases are seldom filed without an extended 
interval of out-of-court negotiations.  These negotiations usually last 
months, sometimes over a year, and are held in the shadow of a chapter 11 
filing.  Consequently, as these negotiations progress, decision makers are 
already planning where to file and can easily change states of 
incorporation, move assets and offices, or make other maneuvers to 
facilitate a filing in their chosen district.  These are the consequences of 
permissive venue rules.  But what is the harm? 
V.  THE HARM OF FORUM SHOPPING 
Once the history, basis, and frequency of forum shopping are 
established, the debate leads to the harm, perceived or actual, of forum 
shopping.  The harm from forum shopping is a convoluted issue because 
the practice in bankruptcy is unique from that which exists in customary 
civil litigation.  The primary differences stem from corporate debtors’ 
incentives and control over venue and the high forum shopping rate that 
exists in bankruptcy. 
                                                                                                                          
157 Debtors have attempted to use this technique in many instances.  See In re Dunmore Homes, 
Inc., 380 B.R. 663, 667 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2008) (explaining that debtor’s only connection to New York 
was its incorporation in the state on the eve of bankruptcy); United States Trustee’s Omnibus Reply to 
Objections to United States Trustee’s Motion, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1412 and Fed. R. Bankr. P. 
1014(a), to Transfer Venue of These Cases in the Interest of Justice at 6–7, In re Patriot Coal Corp., 
482 B.R. 718 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.) (No.12-12900) (arguing that the debtors’ chief financial officer 
essentially admitted to incorporating two affiliates in the weeks before the bankruptcy filing for the sole 
purpose of establishing venue in the Southern District of New York); Motion of Buffalo Rock 
Company to Transfer Venue of the Debtors’ Bankruptcy Cases to the United States Bankruptcy Court 
for the Middle District of Florida, Jacksonville Division or Such Other District Where Venue Would 
Be Appropriate Under 28 U.S.C. § 1408 at 6, In re Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc., No. 05-11063 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. Mar. 14, 2005) (explaining that debtor had incorporated an affiliate just twelve days before 
the bankruptcy filing in order to secure venue in the Southern District of New York).  But see 
Memorandum of Law in Support of United States Trustee’s Motion, Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1412 and 
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 1014(a)(1), to Transfer Venue of These Cases in the Interest of Justice, In re Patriot 
Coal, 482 B.R. 718 (No.12-12900) (arguing that case should not be transferred pursuant to the court’s 
rationale in Winn-Dixie). 
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A.  The Incentive to Forum Shop 
Forum shopping encompasses a number of strategic practices.  In 
bankruptcy, the term is the by-product of outcome maximization in at least 
one of three distinct areas.  Appreciating corporate debtors’ different 
motivations for forum shopping is necessary because not all manner of 
forum shopping is negative.158 
Primarily, corporate debtors and other key decision makers159 are 
shopping for favorable law.  As is the case in almost any legal dispute, 
forum shoppers in bankruptcy are acutely aware of variance in substantive 
law between circuits and even courts within the same circuit.160  Not 
surprisingly, some of these differences can alter the disposition of a 
bankruptcy case.  In fact, from circuit to circuit, there exists a significant 
variance in bankruptcy law on case-defining issues.161  This fact forces 
                                                                                                                          
158 The Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized the value of some types of forum shopping.  
Supreme Court jurisprudence has only attempted to foreclose one type: that which occurs in diversity 
cases and results from substantive law differences between federal and state courts in the same state.  
See Debra Lyn Bassett, The Forum Game, 84 N.C. L. REV. 333, 368 (2006) (discussing the importance 
of forum shopping).  However, bankruptcy is exclusively a product of federal law, and the key aspects 
of the process are overseen exclusively by the federal courts.  There is no forum shopping in 
bankruptcy that could implicate federalism concerns, at least as to the issues within this Article’s 
purview. 
159 Any discussion of incentives must recognize that a debtor’s forum selection choice is often 
times dictated by secured creditors and equity sponsors.  See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. 
Rasmussen, Antibankruptcy, 119 YALE L.J. 648, 651–53 (2010) (discussing incentives).  Naturally, 
these outside third parties hold leverage in many instances and have their own incentives in guiding a 
case to one venue over another.  Nevertheless, we can generally describe the incentives of the key 
decision makers in this area because their objectives are usually a poorly kept secret. 
160 See Forum Shopping, First Day Orders, and Case Management Issues in Bankruptcy, 1 
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 515, 516–17 (2003) (statement by panelist Richard M. Cieri, Partner at 
Kirkland & Ellis) (discussing some of practitioners’ perceived differences between circuits).  
161 For example, corporate debtors needing to assume key non-assignable executory contracts 
under 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) will avoid the Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits, which have adopted the 
hypothetical test for assumption.  See In re Catapult Entm’t, 165 F.3d 747, 754–55 (9th Cir. 1999); In 
re W. Elecs., Inc., 852 F.2d 79, 83–84 (3d Cir. 1988) (disallowing assignment of executory contracts 
that are key and non-assignable); In re Catron, 158 B.R. 629, 633 (E.D. Va. 1993) (disallowing 
assignment of executory contracts that are key and non-assignable), aff’d 25 F.3d 1038 (4th Cir. 1993) 
(per curiam).  Corporate debtors seeking to modify terms or entirely reject collective bargaining 
agreements may seek to avoid the Third Circuit.  See Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Corp. v. United 
Steelworkers, 791 F.2d 1074, 1093 (3d Cir. 1986) (disallowing modification or rejection of collective 
bargaining agreements).  Corporate debtors that expect to seek third party releases under its plan of 
reorganization will most likely avoid the Fifth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.  See In re Lowenschuss, 67 
F.3d 1394, 1401–02 (9th Cir. 1995) (disallowing a third party release); In re Zale Corp., 62 F.3d 746, 
760–01 (5th Cir. 1995) (same); In re W. Real Estate Fund, Inc., 922 F.2d 592, 601–02 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(same).  Executives and other key decision makers concerned about the bankruptcy court appointing a 
chapter 11 trustee because of executive malfeasance may seek to avoid the First Circuit.  See Tradex 
Corp. v. Morse, 339 B.R. 823, 830–32 (D. Mass. 2006) (finding that a party seeking the appointment of 
a trustee needed to make the necessary showing by a preponderance of the evidence).  Instead, they 
may file in either the Second Circuit or the Third Circuit.  See In re Sharon Steel Corp., 871 F.2d 1217, 
1226 (3d Cir. 1989) (finding that a party seeking the appointment of a trustee must make the necessary 
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corporate debtors and other key decision makers to consider aggressive 
actions in order to control the venue of their bankruptcy cases. 
Secondly, corporate debtors and other key decision makers are 
particularly sensitive to the perceived experience, knowledge, and 
personality of the judges in any given district.  This flows from a general 
understanding that “[i]n a large Chapter 11 case, judges have a great deal 
of discretion in applying the Bankruptcy Code.”162  For example, the 
exercise of this discretion is frequently seen in a number of prominent, 
case-altering matters including the rejection of collective bargaining 
agreements, “debtor in possession financing terms, lift stay motions, 
[requests to use] cash collateral and [myriad] valuation disputes.”163  
                                                                                                                          
showing by clear and convincing evidence); In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 336 B.R. 610, 655–56 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006) (same).  Constituencies concerned about the bankruptcy court reclassifying 
their debt as equity contributions will attempt to persuade the debtor to file in the Ninth Circuit.  See In 
re Pac. Express, Inc., 69 B.R. 112, 115 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1986) (being unfriendly towards an action to 
reclassify debt as equity).  Or, at the very least, a constituency concerned about the court reclassifying 
debt as equity will not file in the Sixth Circuit.  See Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Comm’r. of Internal 
Revenue, 800 F.2d 625, 629–32 (6th Cir. 1986) (upholding a haphazard reclassification of debt as 
equity on appeal).  Corporate debtors intent on selling substantially all of their assets in the initial days 
of the bankruptcy case may seek to file in the Second Circuit.  See In re Lionel Corp., 722 F.2d 1063, 
1071 (2d Cir. 1983) (recognizing a debtor’s right to sell substantially all of its assets through a 11 
U.S.C. § 363 asset sale if there is a good business reason); In re Gen. Motors Corp., 407 B.R. 463, 493 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2009) (allowing the debtor to sell substantially all of its assets through a 11 U.S.C. § 
363 asset sale conducted the month following the petition date).  Corporate debtors intent on 
discharging CERCLA obligations will avoid the First, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits.  See Waterville 
Indus., Inc. v. First Hartford Corp., 124 B.R. 411, 414 (D. Me. 1991) (refusing to discharge a CERCLA 
obligation as a matter of course); United States v. Union Scrap Iron & Metal, 123 B.R. 831, 838–39 (D. 
Minn. 1990) (disposing of the motion to discharge a CERCLA obligation unfavorably); United States 
v. Northernaire Plating Co., 670 F. Supp. 742, 748 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (refusing to discharge a 
CERCLA obligation).  Counsel for a corporate debtor concerned about potential conflicts of interest 
affecting its approval as debtor’s lead counsel may avoid the Seventh Circuit.  See In re Envirodyne 
Indus., Inc., 150 B.R. 1008, 1021 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1993) (enforcing conflict of interest law justifiably 
and rigorously).  Corporate debtors intent on making payments to critical vendors for prepetition claims 
will avoid the Fifth and Seventh Circuits.  See In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2004) 
(refusing to pay vendors for prepetition claims); In re Oxford Mgm’t, Inc., 4 F.3d 1329, 1337 (5th Cir. 
1993) (refusing to pay vendors for prepetition claims, not even critical ones); In re Coserv, LLC, 273 
B.R. 487, 501 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 2002) (disallowing prepayment of incredibly critical vendors in 
prepetition claims).  Constituencies concerned about a prepetition leveraged buyout being attacked as a 
fraudulent transfer will attempt to persuade the debtor to file in the Second, Third, Sixth, Eighth, or 
Tenth Circuits.  See Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Alfa, S.A.B. de C.V., 651 F.3d 329, 347 (2d 
Cir. 2011) (refusing to classify something as a fraudulent transfer); In re Plassein Int’l Corp., 590 F.3d 
252, 254 (3d Cir. 2009) (classifying a transfer as non-fraudulent); In re QSI Holdings, 571 F.3d 545, 
551 (6th Cir. 2009) (classifying a transfer as non-fraudulent); Contemporary Indus. Corp. v. Frost, 564 
F.3d 981, 989 (8th Cir. 2009) (accepting the prepetition leveraged buyout as non-fraudulent); In re 
Kaiser Steel Corp., 952 F.2d 1230, 1238–39 (10th Cir. 1991) (accepting the prepetition leveraged 
buyout as non-fraudulent).  Or, at the very least, they will adroitly avoid the Eleventh Circuit.  See In re 
Munford, Inc., 98 F.3d 604, 613–14 (11th Cir. 1996) (deciding a prepetition leveraged buyout was 
fraudulent). 
162 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 20, at 717. 
163 Id.  
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Therefore, in compiling a list of possible venues for a bankruptcy case, 
debtor’s counsel is often tasked with reviewing each bankruptcy judge in 
each available district; opinions will be evaluated, comprehensive judicial 
assessments by independent third parties reviewed,164 and practitioner 
assessments aggregated.165  Key decision makers will classify and rank 
each bankruptcy judge based on her actual or perceived position on key 
issues facing the corporate debtor and its constituencies.  This exacting 
process serves to assist counsel to corporate debtors and other key decision 
makers in formulating venue decisions.  Specifically, corporate debtors and 
other key decision makers will be looking to (i) avoid a district in which 
one or more of the bankruptcy judges are deemed to be unfavorable; (ii) 
gain access to a district where there is only one bankruptcy judge, and that 
judge is deemed to be favorable;166 or (iii) gain access to a district where 
the likelihood of getting an unfavorable judge is deemed to be small 
enough to warrant filing in the district. 
Finally, the less familiar form of forum shopping in bankruptcy 
involves forum shoppers who are drawn to a district for perceived 
procedural/administrative benefits.  These benefits include court practice, 
services and procedure, local rules, and even the role of the local Office of 
the United States Trustee (the “UST Office”).  Some proponents of the 
current venue rules have argued that certain districts have more efficient 
procedures and practices and the search for efficiency fuels procedure 
shopping.167  But it is unlikely that efficiency is the overriding concern.  
Efficiency lacks value if it negatively affects a debtor’s outcome 
maximization.  In reality, many local rules strongly favor corporate debtors 
by creating timelines and procedures that inhibit dissent.  Further, among 
its many functions, the UST Office monitors the fees charged by attorneys 
and other professionals for services they render to the debtor and certain 
other parties in interest.168  Different offices service different districts and 
                                                                                                                          
164 For a commonly used reference guide, see ALMANAC OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (Aspen 
2012).  
165 See Forum Shopping, First Day Orders, and Case Management Issues in Bankruptcy, supra 
note 160, at 519 (statement by panelist Richard M. Cieri, partner at Kirkland & Ellis) (“[W]hen we are 
preparing a case for a Chapter 11 filing, we will actually prepare a chart that will look at each of the 
districts . . . . [and] reflect how various legal issues may be determined by the court.”). 
166 For example, for many years when I practiced, the Honorable Gregg Zive was the sole 
bankruptcy judge in the unofficial “Northern Division” of the District of Nevada.  During his time on 
the bench, Judge Zive was reputed to be a knowledgeable and effective jurist.  Many corporate debtors 
sought to file in Judge Zive’s division, even if it was not a natural forum. 
167 See, e.g., Skeel, What’s So Bad About Delaware?, supra note 62, at 325 (arguing the search for 
efficiency motivates forum shopping).   
168 See U.S. Trustee Program, About the Program, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., 
http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/ust_org/index.htm (last visited Aug. 30, 2013) (clarifying that a specific 
responsibility of UST offices is “[e]nsuring that bankruptcy estates are administered promptly and 
efficiently, and that professional fees are reasonable”). 
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each one has a unique policy for reviewing and objecting to fees.  Debtor’s 
counsel will oftentimes advise clients to avoid a district that is overseen by 
a UST Office that frequently objects to fees and successfully forces 
professionals to significantly reduce their bills.  Counsel to secured 
creditors or equity sponsors that have enough leverage to veto this 
preference will often times defer on this issue. 
It is worthwhile to note that information pertaining to these three 
primary motivations for forum shopping is efficiently disseminated by 
corporate bankruptcy attorneys in a manner unparalleled outside of 
bankruptcy.  Indeed, a small pool of law firms are involved in the venue 
decision for the vast majority of high-profile bankruptcy cases.  I reviewed 
forty-four of the largest bankruptcy cases from 2000–2012169 and compiled 
a list of each debtor’s lead counsel.170  Either (i) Weil Gotshal, (ii) 
Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom, (iii) Kirkland & Ellis, or 
(iv) Sidley Austin was lead counsel in twenty-five of the forty-four 
cases.171  Put differently, one of these four firms was lead bankruptcy 
counsel in 57% of the largest cases filed in the first twelve years of this 
century.  This small pool of repeat players facilitates efficient 
dissemination of public and private information about bankruptcy courts, 
judges, and substantive and procedural trends.  Consequently, courts can 
easily fall out of favor based on one ruling that key decision makers or 
their counsel find distasteful.172 
B.  The Harm of Forum Shopping 
Forum shopping is a fixture of court-adjudicated dispute resolution and 
                                                                                                                          
169 This review was conducted using data from the BRD.  See supra notes 62–63, and 
accompanying text.  Accompanying notes to support the remainder of this section are on file with the 
author. 
170 “Lead counsel” means the firm retained to represent the debtor under section 327(a) of the 
Bankruptcy Code.  In many cases, more than one firm was retained.  In these instances, the firm 
without an office in the filing district was deemed the lead counsel because the firm with the office in 
the filing district was serving as local counsel. 
171 Weil Gotshal was debtor’s lead counsel in eight cases.  Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom 
was debtor’s lead counsel in eight cases.  Kirkland & Ellis was debtor’s lead counsel in five cases.  And 
Sidley Austin was debtor’s lead counsel in four cases.   
172 This was the case for the bankruptcy court in the Northern District of Illinois based on a circuit 
court ruling in In re Kmart Corp., 359 F.3d 866, 869 (7th Cir. 2004).  The bankruptcy court had 
allowed the debtor in that case to make certain controversial payments to critical vendors.  Id. at 868–
69.  This decision was appealed and ultimately overturned by the Seventh Circuit, which explained that 
the bankruptcy court had been too compliant to the debtor’s wishes and created a basis for relief that 
actually did not exist in the Bankruptcy Code.  Id. at 869.  This decision caused the Northern District of 
Illinois to fall out of favor with subsequent corporate debtors who felt that making such payments 
would be vital to a successful reorganization.  See LOPUCKI, supra note 49, at 166 (discussing such 
payments). 
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defended by scholars.173  Nevertheless, in customary civil litigation, a 
number of statutes, court rules, procedures, and principles work together to 
discourage the practice.174  Unfortunately, these safeguards do not apply in 
bankruptcy or are ineffectual due to the unique characteristics of 
bankruptcy cases.175  This discrepancy leads to one significant point that 
general scholarship on this issue overlooks:  the harm of forum shopping 
correlates with the frequency of the practice.  As noted above, seven out of 
ten corporate debtors in my study group forum shopped.  At this frequency 
level, the practice predominates, and the harmful effects manifest. 
Primarily, rampant forum shopping undermines the perception and 
integrity of the bankruptcy system.  When high-profile bankruptcy cases 
repeatedly flee to one of two bankruptcy courts, the process appears to be 
manipulable.176  The perception is that there are courts willing to give 
corporate debtors and other key decision makers the outcomes they seek.  
And, due to a lack of rules governing the venue choice, a debtor can simply 
choose the court that is most flexible.  This impression erodes public 
confidence in the bankruptcy courts and affects creditors, employees, 
unions, and other constituents excluded from the perceived backroom 
dealings.  An attendant problem is that the fairness of the bankruptcy 
system is also called into question.  The court system strives to ensure that 
similarly situated parties receive similar treatment.  Forum shopping leads 
to disparate treatment. 
Further, an abnormally elevated level of forum shopping creates a 
                                                                                                                          
173 See, e.g., Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at Selecting a 
Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 81 (1999) (defending forum shopping as a realistic way to select a venue); 
Bassett, supra note 158, at 339 (applauding choice of law as the engine that drives much of 
contemporary forum shopping); Richard Maloy, Forum Shopping? What’s Wrong With That?, 24 
QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 25, 50 (2005) (stating that many rules govern forum shopping); Rasmussen & 
Thomas, Timing Matters, supra note 62, at 1358 (promoting forum shopping by insolvent 
corporations). 
174 See Maloy, supra note 173, at 50 (delineating a variety of statutes, rules of civil procedure, 
judge-made rules, and legal principles). 
175 The most obvious characteristics are (i) corporate debtors—the presumptive defendant in any 
other civil context—choose venue; (ii) bankruptcy cases progress at a staggering speed; and (iii) the 
bankruptcy venue rules are so permissive that ex post means of curtailing forum shopping are 
ineffective. 
176 Just a few examples include (i) the Los Angeles Dodgers, despite their name and location of 
assets and key personnel, filing in Delaware, In re Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, 465 B.R. 18, 22 (D. Del. 
2011); (ii) GM and Chrysler, the quintessential Michigan companies, filing in the Southern District of 
New York, In re Motors Liquidation Co., 430 B.R. 65, 70 (S.D.N.Y. 2010); (iii) Washington Mutual, 
despite its extensive West Coast operations and lack of East Coast branches, filing in Delaware, In re 
Wash. Mut., Inc., 421 B.R. 143, 146 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009); (iv) American Airlines, the Dallas-based 
company, filing in the Southern District of New York, In re AMR Corp., 491 B.R. 372, 375 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2013); (v) MGM, the famous Hollywood studio and entertainment company, filing in the 
Southern District of New York, In re Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc., 459 B.R. 550, 551 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2010); and (vi) Delta Airlines, one of the preeminent companies in Atlanta, filing in the 
Southern District of New York, In re Delta Air Lines, 342 B.R. 685, 688 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006). 
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unique problem.  Federal trial courts are incubators for legal discourse.  “A 
cornerstone of our judicial system is that the law be subject to a variety of 
interpretations at the trial level.”177  Significant disagreement at the trial 
level will often prompt circuit court review, and disagreement at the circuit 
court level will often prompt Supreme Court review.  “But when a few 
judges, by virtue of sitting in desirable venues, are the only judges to 
review certain issues, the system breaks down.”178  Without discourse, the 
review process ceases.  In effect, the bankruptcy judges in New York and 
Delaware, the magnet courts, are making bankruptcy law.  More 
specifically, the oversubscription to the magnet courts is due, at least in 
part, to corporate debtors’ forum shopping.  Forum shoppers are voicing 
their approval of certain courts’ interpretation of key bankruptcy issues 
and, in many cases, are voicing their disapproval of how other courts have 
interpreted the same issues.  But the interpretations of these magnet courts 
may be inaccurate—too debtor or debtor counsel friendly.  Without 
discourse across bankruptcy courts, these inaccuracies remain 
unchallenged and are actually strengthened by repeated application to a 
long string of cases. 
Finally, cases pooling in just two districts is inefficient.  The magnet 
court judges are overburdened while judges in other courts are 
underutilized.179  Overburdened judges must carefully allocate their time, 
and any misallocation will negatively affect judicial performance and the 
accuracy of rulings.180 
As noted above, the harm of forum shopping correlates with the 
frequency of the practice.  Outside of bankruptcy, the frequency of forum 
shopping is at a rate that allows for a spirited debate regarding the 
perceived harm.  But Megacases forum shop at a staggering rate—a level 
at which the negative effects of forum shopping are concentrated.  Debate 
must shift from a discussion of the harm to an exploration of possible 
solutions. 
                                                                                                                          
177 NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 20, at 782. 
178 Id. 
179 Simply appointing more judges to the magnet courts is not necessarily a viable solution.  A 
single ruling could cause a magnet court to fall out of favor with key decision makers and lead to cases 
pooling in another, perhaps under-staffed, district. 
180 Though outside the scope of this article, there are a number of secondary consequences of 
forum shopping that other scholars have propounded, including (i) higher failure rates for reorganized 
companies filing in the magnet courts, LoPucki & Kalin, supra note 60, at 233, (ii) the propensity of 
some bankruptcy judges to issue debtor-friendly rulings to secure high-profile cases for certain 
districts, LOPUCKI, supra note 52, at 246, and (iii) the inability of small creditors and employees to 
actively participate in a bankruptcy case because the case is filed in a distant, inconvenient venue, 
NAT’L BANKR. REV. COMM’N, supra note 20, at 776–78. 
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VI.  PROPOSED SOLUTIONS:  A MULTIFACETED APPROACH TO A 
MULTIFACETED PROBLEM 
In the following section, I propose a variety of solutions that, if 
implemented, will significantly diffuse the harm caused by forum shopping 
in bankruptcy.  My objective in making these proposals is not to eliminate 
all forms of forum shopping but to merely install some basic boundaries 
and limitations.  The empirical data establish that nine out of ten forum 
shoppers in my study group relied on either the state-of-incorporation 
venue basis or the affiliate filing hook.  Consequently, my proposed 
solutions focus on these two venue bases and fall into one of three 
umbrella categories: (1) changes to the bankruptcy venue statute; 
(2) changes to bankruptcy procedure; and (3) changes to a fundamental 
structural element of our bankruptcy court system. 
A.  Changes to the Bankruptcy Venue Statute 
Changing the venue statute that facilitates forum shopping is the most 
effective method for addressing the harm caused by the practice.  Any 
discussion of changing the venue rules should begin by acknowledging that 
§ 1408’s ambiguous language precludes uniform interpretation and 
undermines bankruptcy policy.  Bankruptcy courts adjudicate cases 
involving natural persons and fictitious entities.181  But these two groups 
are fundamentally distinct, and one comprehensive venue provision will 
invariably fail.  There must be unique and separate treatment for these 
debtors.  Further, my empirical research establishes that the state-of-
incorporation venue basis and the affiliate filing hook are providing the 
means by which parties forum shop.  Therefore, the first step is to 
eliminate § 1408 as it currently exists and return to the language of Rule 
116. 
I propose a new section 1408(a)(1) titled “Natural Persons.”  The new 
section would state that a petition filed by or against a natural person182 can 
only be filed in a district where the individual has had her domicile, 
residence, or principal place of business for the 180 days immediately 
preceding such commencement, or for a longer portion of such 180-day 
period than the domicile, residence, or principal place of business of such 
person were located in any other district. 
I further propose a new section 1408(a)(2) titled “Corporations.”  The 
new section would state that a petition filed by or against a corporation 
may be filed only in the district where the corporation has had its principal 
                                                                                                                          
181 See 11 U.S.C. § 101(41) (2012) (defining “person,” for purposes of the Bankruptcy Code, as 
an “individual, partnership, and corporation”). 
182 The term “natural person” will need to be added to the defined terms under title 1. 
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place of business or its principal assets for the 365 days183 immediately 
preceding such commencement, or for a longer portion of such 365-day 
period than the principal place of business, in the United States, or 
principal assets in the United States, of such corporation were located in 
any other district.184 
In addition to these changes, a new section 1408(a)(4) would replace 
current § 1408(2) and the affiliate filing basis.  The new section 1408(a)(4) 
would provide that a person can file a bankruptcy petition in a district in 
which there is a currently pending case concerning such person’s affiliate, 
general partner, or partnership, as long as such person has a “meaningful 
connection” to the district.  The requirement that the corporate debtor have 
a “meaningful connection” to the district should curtail the most blatant 
forms of forum shopping.  The use of the word “meaningful” would 
compel the debtor to show by a preponderance of the evidence that its 
business and/or operations establish some material relationship to the 
chosen district; at the same time, “meaningful” would demand a far less 
rigorous showing than words such as “substantial” or “predominant.”  The 
term would be undefined in the Bankruptcy Code.185  This approach would 
allow the judiciary to develop the most effective definition of the term.  To 
the extent that a judge determines that the debtor in question fails to 
establish a meaningful connection to the district in question, then the case 
may be transferred to another district pursuant to Rule 1014(a)(2) of the 
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure.186 
                                                                                                                          
183 I believe that the current 180-day period is insufficient to truly address debtor gamesmanship.  
As noted above, the vast majority of Megacase filings are preceded by many months of out-of-court 
restructuring negotiations.  I believe that stretching the evaluation period to 365 days will more 
effectively mitigate forum shopping. 
184 Section 1408(a)(3) should also be added and address venue for partnerships and potentially 
governmental units. 
185 Though the term would be undefined, the statute would need to specify that the fact that the 
chosen district is located within a state in which the corporate debtor is incorporated would not, by 
itself, establish a “meaningful connection.” 
186 “If a petition is filed in an improper district, the court, on the timely motion of a party in 
interest or on its own motion, . . . may . . . transfer [the case] to any other district if the court determines 
that transfer is in the interest of justice . . . .”  FED. R. BANKR. P. 1014(a)(2).  At least some corporate 
debtors will argue that under these new rules, a scenario could unfold where a venue dispute consumes 
the initial days of a bankruptcy case—days that are unquestionably vital for a corporate debtor to 
secure the initial relief it needs to successfully reorganize.  I agree that this risk exists, but I do not 
think this risk in any way undercuts the need for these rules.  Indeed, the venue of a “megacase” is a 
substantial issue.  According to Richard M. Cieri, a partner at Kirkland & Ellis, prior to a bankruptcy 
filing, debtor’s counsel will spend a significant amount of time and resources evaluating this issue.  See 
Forum Shopping, First Day Orders, and Case Management Issues in Bankruptcy, supra note 160, at 
519 (discussing counsel’s evaluation of the different jurisdictions in which bankruptcy petition may be 
filed).  My proposed changes place the onus on corporate debtors to file its case in good faith and after 
careful deliberation.  The ability to access all the remedial benefits of the Bankruptcy Code—benefits 
that are oftentimes wholly unavailable outside of bankruptcy—should require that corporate debtors 
fulfill certain basic obligations.  In many respects, far more is expected from individual consumer 
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B.  Changes to Bankruptcy Procedure 
I also advocate changes to bankruptcy procedure that would support 
the proposed changes to the venue statute.  Primarily, I suggest that the 
bankruptcy petition used by all debtors should be revised.  Currently, in 
establishing venue, debtors are asked to choose one of three boxes.187  The 
first box is to be checked if the debtor’s venue choice is based on its 
domicile, residence, principal place of business, or principal assets.  The 
second box is to be checked if the debtor’s venue choice is based on the 
filing district of an affiliate.  The last box is to be checked if the debtor is 
involved in a foreign bankruptcy proceeding.  I believe that the venue box 
should be revised so that a debtor must affirmatively state which specific 
section 1408 basis supports its venue choice; having four venue bases 
grouped together is inappropriate.  Further, each corporate debtor should 
be obligated to file a separate form that briefly explains why the chosen 
venue is appropriate.  This additional requirement would facilitate a court’s 
review of the propriety of the venue choice. 
There is currently no instruction to bankruptcy court judges to verify 
that a debtor’s chosen venue is proper.  As it presently stands, courts 
presume that the debtor’s venue choice is appropriate.188  A party that 
objects to the venue choice must file a transfer motion and bears the 
burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that a transfer of 
the case is warranted.189   
I propose that this burden should initially be on the debtor.  Federal 
Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 1014(a) should be modified to provide that 
courts must verify the propriety of the debtor’s venue choice at the outset 
of the case or as soon as practicable.190  Concurrently, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 
should be amended to provide that a ruling on venue is to be considered 
                                                                                                                          
debtors who must satisfy a variety of strict requirements to gain access to the bankruptcy courts.  My 
proposed changes merely place similar obligations on corporate debtors.  To the extent that a corporate 
debtor engages in forum shopping, it runs the risk of facing logistical and legal hurdles that could 
severely undermine its reorganization prospects.  Arguably, most key decision makers will refuse to 
pursue courses of conduct that can expose the corporation to oversized risk.  Under my changes, as key 
decision makers move away from venue gamesmanship, the integrity of the legal system would be 
enhanced, and the results for the vast majority of constituencies would improve. 
187 See supra notes 68–70 and accompanying text. 
188 See, e.g., In re Enron Corp., 274 B.R. 327, 342 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2002) (“A debtor’s choice of 
forum is entitled to great weight if venue is proper.”). 
189 Id. 
190 The rest of Rule 1014(a) can remain unchanged because it flows naturally after the added 
language.  Subdivision (1) addresses the instance where a case is filed in a proper district but parties in 
interest still request a transfer of venue, while subdivision (2) addresses the instance where a case is 
filed in an improper district.  FED. R. BANKR. P. 1014(a). 
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interlocutory and appealable by any party in interest.191  Naturally, the 
importance of first-day hearings for Megacases cannot be overstated.  
These hearings allow the debtor to secure financing and other relief vital 
for transitioning into bankruptcy and preserving any hope of a successful 
reorganization.  The relief corporate debtors seek in these hearings cannot 
be stalled while a ruling on venue is appealed, and they need not be.  
Bankruptcy judges can rule on the debtor’s first-day motions and grant the 
appropriate relief necessary for the debtor to begin operating as a debtor in 
possession subject to the fact that the case could be transferred to another 
court.192  In most cases, these orders will merely provide interim relief for 
some finite period of time; this is done to allow unsecured creditors and 
other parties in interest the opportunity to appear and object to any of the 
relief granted.   
To fashion a viable system for appeals of venue rulings that would not 
significantly disrupt the current system of first-day orders, an appeal of a 
venue ruling under my proposed changes would be directly appealable to 
the appropriate circuit court of appeals.193  The customary filing timelines 
would need to be truncated.  A party appealing a venue ruling would have 
a limited number of days to file its notice of appeal and appellate brief.  
Reply briefs would be due a short time after, and the appropriate appellate 
court would perform an expedited review.194  In the event that venue is 
found to be improper, the bankruptcy court, pursuant to Rule 1014(a)(2), 
would decide exactly when and where to transfer the case “under [a 
flexible] timetable that minimizes . . . the harm to the creditors and other 
stakeholders” in the case.195 
                                                                                                                          
191 Presently, subsection (a) of this statute only speaks to interlocutory orders and decrees in 
matters of injunctions, receiverships, and the determination of rights and liabilities in admiralty cases.  
28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (2006). 
192 See In re Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Publ’g Co., 474 B.R. 122, 139 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2012) 
(noting the court’s agreement to transfer an improperly venued case but only after granting certain 
forms of relief to avoid significant disruption to the debtor’s reorganization prospects). 
193 28 U.S.C. § 157 and Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8001 will need to be modified to 
effectuate this change.  The former discusses the interplay between district and bankruptcy courts as to 
referrals and withdrawals of matters under the Bankruptcy Code, 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2006), while the 
latter addresses the procedure for appealing final and interlocutory judgments, orders, or decrees of 
bankruptcy judges, FED. R. BANKR. P. 8001. 
194 Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 8002 through 8009 provide the basic deadlines for 
appealing a bankruptcy court order, specifically as to filing notices, motions for leave, designations of 
record items and issues presented, and briefs.  FED. R. BANKR. P. 8002–09.  The timelines established 
by these rules and any attendant local rules would need to be truncated. 
195 In re Houghton Mifflin, 474 B.R. at 137.  As previously stated, at least some corporate debtors 
will argue that this provision could threaten a debtor’s reorganization prospects.  I agree that this 
possibility exists, but I reiterate that I do not believe that this risk in any way undercuts the need for the 
change.  Once again, these changes are placing the onus on corporate debtors to file their cases in the 
appropriate venue.  To the extent that venue is questionable, a debtor runs the risk of suffering 
significant disruption during the initial weeks of its case.  Ultimately, venue rules and procedures 
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I also advocate for a modification of Rule 1014.  Subsection (a)(2) 
currently provides that if a case is filed in the improper district the 
bankruptcy court “may” transfer the case.196  The provision should be 
modified so that transfer is mandatory in instances where a case is filed in 
the improper district unless transfer would cause irreparable damage to the 
estate. 
Finally, under the new rules and procedures outlined above, counsel 
seeking to engage in aggressive gamesmanship with a client’s venue 
decision would run the risk of causing significant disruption to her client’s 
reorganization prospects.  The deterrence effect from these proposed 
changes is clear, though potentially insufficient to deter the most egregious 
conduct.  Key decision makers may be willing to risk excessive harm to a 
corporate debtor’s reorganization prospects if filing in a particular district 
can be personally beneficial.197  Under the new rules and procedures 
outlined above, a significant portion of the harm from aggressive 
gamesmanship could be externalized.  Therefore, bankruptcy courts should 
be explicitly authorized to award sanctions for reckless forum shopping.  
Arguably, bankruptcy judges already have the power to award such 
sanctions under Rule 9011.198  But Rule 9011(b) should be modified to 
explicitly provide that by filing in a specific district, debtor’s counsel is 
making a representation that there is a sound basis supporting that 
decision.199  To the extent that representation turns out to be erroneous, a 
bankruptcy judge should have the option of sanctioning a debtor’s lead and 
local counsel.200  The sanction would be limited to the reasonable 
attorney’s fees and other expenses incurred by any party that brought a 
transfer motion or otherwise contested the venue choice. 
                                                                                                                          
should not be drafted to insulate debtors from the fact that gamesmanship comes with inherent risks 
and consequences. 
196 FED. R. BANKR. P. 1014(a)(2). 
197 For example, this would be the case for executives who have engaged in corporate 
malfeasance and fear the appointment of a chapter 11 trustee who may aggressively investigate 
prepetition activities. 
198 Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 9011 addresses representations to the court and 
sanctions.  FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011.  As reflected in the accompanying notes of the Advisory 
Committee on Rules, this rule is modeled after Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which 
addresses these same subjects.  See FED. R. BANK. P. 9011 advisory committee’s note (stating that the 
rule is meant to “conform to F.R.C.P. 11”). 
199 Presently, Rule 9011(b) only requires that attorney representations are put forth with a proper 
purpose, are not frivolous, and are supported by evidence in the record.  FED. R. BANKR. P. 9011. 
200 Sanctioning the insolvent debtor would be pointless because that would invariably serve as a 
sanction on the unsecured creditors of the debtor’s estate—–a party that generally has no input in the 
venue decision.  Sanctioning corporate executives would also be pointless as these executives typically 
have directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance policies that invariably cover such penalties.  The threat 
of penalizing these executives would not necessarily deter gamesmanship. 
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C.  Changes to Bankruptcy Court Structure 
The previous sections offer a number of proposals that should curtail 
the most harmful forum shopping practices in bankruptcy.  My proposals 
focus on the venue rules and procedures associated with filing a 
bankruptcy case.  My final proposal is unprecedented and seeks to effect 
change by altering the very structure of the bankruptcy courts. 
A significant number of corporate debtors and other key decision 
makers are motivated by the promise of favorable law.  To the extent that 
the law on significant issues is uniform across circuits, one primary 
incentive to forum shop is mitigated.  Only Congress and the Supreme 
Court can act to impose this sort of uniformity.  Unfortunately, Congress 
has demonstrated neither the inclination nor the ability,201 and the Supreme 
Court arguably does not have the docket capacity to effectuate this type of 
change.  A similar problem plagued patent law in the 1970s.  Congress’s 
solution to that problem could benefit the bankruptcy system. 
Prior to 1982, the regional federal appellate courts handled appeals of 
all district court patent rulings.202  Unfortunately, the appellate courts 
oftentimes exhibited a fundamental misunderstanding of patent law’s 
technical complexity, and rulings across circuits lacked uniformity and 
undermined the patent system.203  Indeed, there was a wide disparity in the 
way circuits treated patents.  And the Supreme Court, it seems, did not 
have the docket capacity to take on the number of cases necessary to 
resolve this schism.  The lack of uniformity created a scenario where the 
venue of a patent dispute could, by itself, determine if a patent would be 
recognized; aggressive forum shopping was the natural by-product.  This 
disequilibrium decreased the economic value of patents because a patent 
holder had difficulty determining the enforceability of her patent.204 
                                                                                                                          
201 On July 14, 2011, Rep. Lamar Smith introduced the “Chapter 11 Bankruptcy Venue Reform 
Act of 2011,” which seeks to amend title 28 and eliminate state of incorporation as a basis for venue.  
H.R. 2533, 112th Cong. (2011).  The bill was referred to committee in July 2011 and has languished 
there.  The odds are slim that any action will be taken on this bill. 
202 Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444, 1455 (2010). 
203 See id. at 1455–56 (noting the perplexity with which many judges and attorneys encountered 
patent law and the inconstant application thereof across the circuits); see also George C. Beighley, Jr., 
The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: Has it Fulfilled Congressional Expectations?, 21 
FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 671, 675–76 (2011) (“[J]udges of the regional circuit 
courts of appeals generally lacked expertise in patent law . . . .  Also, the patent decision of the various 
circuit courts of appeal were characterized by a lack of uniformity.”). 
204 See Beighley, supra note 203, at 677–78 (“[T]he value of a patent often depended on where 
the case was tried.  The main economic effect of this disparity in treatment of patents across the circuits 
was that it prevented the patent owners from ascertaining the validity of their patents and knowing if 
they had a valuable patent or worthless patent.” (footnote omitted)); Fromer, supra note 202, at 1464–
65 (recognizing evidence that success rates in patent litigation differ across jurisdictions, and that when 
it appears venue is determinative of case outcome the result is “an atmosphere of ex ante legal 
uncertainty in which entities are unsure of what the law will require of them”). 
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Attempts to bring greater uniformity to patent law and curtail forum 
shopping culminated with the enactment and signing into law of the 
Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982 (the “FCIA”).205  The Act created 
the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, which was granted “subject matter 
jurisdiction over all patent appeals, trademark appeals from the [United 
States Patent and Trademark Office], appeals from the Court of Federal 
Claims . . . and other areas of national concern.”206  Congress reasoned that 
the new court would (i) be filled with preeminent jurists and scholars of 
patent law, (ii) be able to take far more patent appeals than the Supreme 
Court, and (iii) have the necessary understanding of the field to issue 
opinions that would clarify most circuit splits.207  Ideally, greater 
uniformity would ease forum shopping and bring enhanced value and 
certainty to the patent market.  Over the last thirty years, scholars and 
practitioners have noted that the Federal Circuit has largely succeeded in 
its efforts to promote greater uniformity in patent law.208 
The same problems that plagued patent law prior to 1982 and provided 
the impetus for the Federal Circuit currently plague the bankruptcy system.  
Indeed, from circuit to circuit, there exists a significant variance in the law 
on case-defining bankruptcy issues.209  This variance is one of the primary 
incentives for corporate debtors to forum shop.  As noted above, seven out 
of ten corporate debtors in my study group forum shopped.  As was the 
case for patent law in the decades prior to the passage of the FCIA, the 
Supreme Court appears unable to review the number of cases necessary to 
promote uniformity in bankruptcy.  Indeed, from 1991 to 2010, the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari in approximately 1,812 cases.210  
                                                                                                                          
205 Beighley, supra note 203, at 699. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. at 689, 701–02. 
208 See, e.g., id. at 730–31 (noting interviewed judges’ comments that the creation of the Federal 
Circuit has brought “greater uniformity” to the field of patent law); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, The 
Federal Circuit: A Case Study in Specialized Courts, 64 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 8 (1989) (stating that the 
Federal Circuit “has articulated rules that are consistent with the underlying philosophy of patent law”); 
Donald R. Dunner, A Retrospective of the Federal Circuit’s First 25 Years, 17 FED. CIR. B.J. 127, 130 
(2007) (“The common view is that [the Federal Circuit] has largely succeeded in its uniformity 
efforts.”); Craig Allen Nard & John F. Duffy, Rethinking Patent Law’s Uniformity Principle, 101 NW. 
U. L. REV. 1619, 1620 (2007) (recognizing that since its establishment, the Federal Circuit has “earned 
praise for achieving a desirable degree of uniformity in place of regional circuit precedents perceived to 
be disjointed and conflicting”).  
209 See cases cited supra note 161. 
210 This tally primarily relied on figures published by the Harvard Law Review.  In its November 
issues from 1991 to 2010, the journal summarized leading cases from the previous Supreme Court 
Term and also delineated the total number and subject matter of the Term’s cases.  See, e.g., The 
Supreme Court, 1990 Term—Leading Cases, 105 HARV. L. REV. 177 (1991); see also Supreme Court 
Decisions, 30 August 1990 and After, LEGAL INFO. INST., http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/ (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2013) (offering an archive of Supreme Court decisions from 1991). 
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However, only forty-one of these were bankruptcy cases (2%),211 and only 
nineteen of the 1,812 cases (1%) involved corporate debtors.212  As such, 
the majority of bankruptcy cases which were granted certiorari involved 
consumer bankruptcy issues that offer little guidance to bankruptcy judges 
and parties involved in corporate debtor cases. 
In the current bankruptcy system, parties generally have the option of 
appealing a bankruptcy ruling to the district court sitting in that district or 
the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) for that district, assuming one 
exists.  The next step in the appellate process involves the circuit court of 
appeals and then the Supreme Court.  As previously discussed, the multiple 
decades since the Federal Circuit’s creation provide a comprehensive 
perspective on the benefits the court has brought to the resolution of patent 
disputes.  I posit that the Federal Circuit’s positive effect could be 
extended to the bankruptcy system. Therefore, I propose a system for 
appeals of bankruptcy rulings that borrows from patent and trademark 
appeals, as well as appeals of decisions on military veterans’ claims.213  
Primarily, local districts would continue to dictate the first level of appeal.  
Appeals of bankruptcy court rulings would either go to the federal district 
court sitting in that district or the BAP, if one exists in that district.  But 
appeals of both district court and BAP rulings would go directly to a newly 
created United States Court of Appeals for Bankruptcy.214  The court 
would have between three and seven Article III judges that would only 
hear bankruptcy appeals.  This group would be comprised of experienced 
bankruptcy academics, practitioners, and judges appointed by the 
President.215  This critical mass of bankruptcy experts216 fully devoted to 
                                                                                                                          
211 See discussion and sources cited supra note 210. 
212 See discussion and sources cited supra note 210. 
213 A military veteran’s benefit claim is first heard by the local veterans’ affairs office.  An appeal 
from an adverse ruling is heard by the Board of Veterans’ Appeals.  An appeal from the board’s ruling 
is heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans’ Claims.  An appeal from the court of appeals’ 
ruling is heard by the Federal Circuit.  This system allows for multiple steps of lower court review prior 
to the involvement of the Federal Circuit.  See Paul R. Gugliuzza, Veterans Benefits in 2010: A New 
Dialogue Between the Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 1201, 1204–10 
(2011) (outlining the appellate system relating to veterans’ benefits).  See generally 38 U.S.C. §§ 7251–
99 (2006) (providing the organization, jurisdiction, procedure, review, and other characteristics of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans’ Claims).   
214 As previously mentioned, I propose that bankruptcy judges should rule on venue at the outset 
of the case or as soon as practicable and such rulings would be interlocutory.  To the extent that the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for Bankruptcy is created, 28 U.S.C. § 1292 should be amended to provide that 
an appeal of a venue ruling would be the exclusive jurisdiction of that court.  This procedure would 
follow the practice for venue rulings in patent disputes and allow for expedited review that minimizes 
disruption to the bankruptcy case.  See supra Part VI.B. 
215 The court’s principal office would be in Washington, D.C., but it would be authorized to sit 
anywhere in the United States.  This flexibility would facilitate attracting preeminent experts in the 
field. 
216 The experience of this body would stand in stark contrast to other circuit courts of appeal that 
currently hear appeals of district court and BAP rulings.  Indeed, with few exceptions and as previously 
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addressing the disparate treatment of case-dispositive issues across the 
circuits would enhance uniformity of business bankruptcy law.217 
This uniformity will, in turn, reduce forum shopping to an extent 
greater than has been witnessed in patent law.  Many believe that the 
Federal Circuit, despite its many accomplishments, has been unsuccessful 
in curtailing forum shopping to the extent originally anticipated.218  
Plaintiffs in patent disputes continue to forum shop, most notably to the 
Eastern District of Texas, due to the perception that certain forums have (i) 
“plaintiff-friendly juries” and (ii) special procedural rules such as “rules 
that compel open discovery with tight deadlines to which the judges 
strictly adhere, resulting in quick and relatively inexpensive trials.”219  
However, juries play no role in the adjudication of corporate bankruptcy 
disputes, so there is no risk of jury shopping in bankruptcy.  Further, the 
solutions I propose above invariably close many of the procedural 
loopholes that motivate forum shoppers.  Consequently, the creation of the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for Bankruptcy, coupled with my other proposed 
changes, should significantly alter forum shoppers’ incentives and means. 
                                                                                                                          
discussed here, circuit court judges tend to have no background in bankruptcy and are unable to 
develop expertise in this area because of the few bankruptcy cases these courts hear. 
217 A federal choice-of-law provision may be a worthwhile alternative to this structural change to 
the bankruptcy courts.  To the extent that the creation of the U.S. Court of Appeals for Bankruptcy is 
too radical, the Judicial Conference could instead create a choice-of-law rule for bankruptcy courts.  
The rule would state that each bankruptcy case will be governed by the laws of the “place” in which the 
debtor has had its principal place of business or its principal assets for the 365 days immediately 
preceding such commencement, or for a longer portion of such 365-day period than the principal place 
of business, in the United States, or principal assets in the United States, of such corporation were 
located in any other district.  The use of the word “place” will allow the court to use federal circuit law 
or state law as necessary.  To the extent there are multiple debtors, the court would make its evaluation 
based on the consolidated corporate family’s assets or principal place of business.  A choice-of-law 
provision would curtail law shopping and represents a viable alternative. 
218 See Fromer, supra note 202, at 1468 (noting that while the creation of the Federal Circuit has 
“smoothed out some of the harmful effects of forum shopping,” many of the problems initially sought 
to be remedied still remain). 
219 Yan Leychkis, Of Fire Ants and Claim Construction:  An Empirical Study of the Meteoric Rise 
of the Eastern District of Texas as a Preeminent Forum for Patent Litigation, 9 YALE J.L. & TECH. 
193, 206 (2007); see also Dunner, supra note 208, at 130 (referring to the Eastern District of Texas as a 
“pro-patentee venue”); Alisha Kay Taylor, What Does Forum Shopping in the Eastern District of Texas 
Mean for Patent Reform?, 6 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 570 (2007) (discussing the appeal 
and attraction of many patent litigants to the Eastern District of Texas).  
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
The forum shopping problem in bankruptcy is oversized.  The data 
establish that 110 of the 159 Megacases filed from January 1, 2007 to June 
30, 2012, forum shopped.  Over the last two decades, the pace of forum 
shopping and the number of parties harmed by the practice has risen 
significantly.  The problem requires congressional and judicial action on a 
variety of levels.  This Article proposes unprecedented solutions that target 
the bankruptcy venue statute, bankruptcy procedure, and fundamental 
elements of bankruptcy court structure.  The solutions range from the 
intuitive to the radical.  But all are necessary in order to install some basic 
boundaries and limitations on a harmful practice that is beginning to 
predominate. 
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APPENDIX 
FORUM SHOPPING: DISTRIBUTION AND VENUE BASIS 
Corporation 
Name 
Forum 
Shopped 
Did 
Not 
Forum 
Shop 
District 
Filed 
Bases for Establishing Venue 
Principal 
Place of 
Business 
State of 
Incorp. 
Affiliate 
Filing 
Principal 
Place of 
Assets 
1st Centennial 
Bancorp220  1 C.D. Cal. 1     
AbitibiBowater 
Inc.221 1  D. Del.  1   
Accuride 
Corp.222 1  D. Del.  1   
Advanta 
Corp.223 1  D. Del.  1   
Affiliated 
Media224 1  D. Del.  1   
Ahern Rentals, 
Inc.225 1  D. Nev. 1    
Aleris 
International, 
Inc.226 
1  D. Del.  1   
Ambac 
Financial 
Group, Inc.227  
1 S.D.N.Y. 1    
AMCORE 
Financial, 
Inc.228  
1 N.D. Ill. 1    
                                                                                                                          
220 In re 1st Centennial Bancorp, No. 09-15570 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 25, 2009). 
221 In re AbitibiBowater Inc., No. 09-11296 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 16, 2009). 
222 In re Accuride Corp., No. 09-13449 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 8, 2009). 
223 In re Advanta Corp., No. 09-13931 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 8, 2009). 
224 In re Affiliated Media, Inc., No. 10-10202 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 26, 2010). 
225 In re Ahern Rentals, Inc., No. 11-53860 (Bankr. D. Nev. Dec. 22, 2011). 
226 In re Aleris Int’l, Inc., No. 09-10478 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 12, 2009). 
227 In re Ambac Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 10-15973 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 8, 2010). 
228 In re AMCORE Fin., Inc., No. 10-37144 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 19, 2010). 
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Corporation 
Name 
Forum 
Shopped 
Did 
Not 
Forum 
Shop 
District 
Filed 
Bases for Establishing Venue 
Principal 
Place of 
Business 
State of 
Incorp. 
Affiliate 
Filing 
Principal 
Place of 
Assets 
American 
Home 
Mortgage 
Investment 
Corp.229 
1  D. Del.   1  
American 
Media 
Operations, 
Inc.230 
1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
American 
Mortgage 
Acceptance 
Co.231 
 1 S.D.N.Y. 1    
AmericanWest 
Bancorporation
232  
1 E.D. Wash. 1    
AMR Corp.233 1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
Anthracite 
Capital, Inc.234  1 S.D.N.Y. 1    
Apex Silver 
Mines Ltd.235 1  S.D.N.Y.    1 
Aventine 
Renewable 
Energy 
Holdings236 
1  D. Del.  1   
Bank 
Holdings237  1 D. Nev. 1    
                                                                                                                          
229 In re Am. Home Mortg. Inv. Corp., No. 07-11048 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 6, 2007). 
230 In re Am. Media Operations, Inc., No. 10-16141 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2010). 
231 In re Am. Mortg. Acceptance Co., No. 10-12196 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 26, 2010). 
232 In re AmericanWest Bancorporation, No. 10-06097 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Oct. 28, 2010). 
233 In re AMR Corp., No. 11-15463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 29, 2011). 
234 In re Anthracite Capital, Inc., No. 10-11319 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 15, 2010). 
235 In re Apex Silver Mines Ltd., No. 09-10182 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2009). 
236 In re Aventine Renewable Energy Holdings, No. 09-11214 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 7, 2009). 
237 In re Bank Holdings, No. 10-55041 (Bankr. D. Nev. Dec. 30, 2010). 
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Corporation 
Name 
Forum 
Shopped 
Did 
Not 
Forum 
Shop 
District 
Filed 
Bases for Establishing Venue 
Principal 
Place of 
Business 
State of 
Incorp. 
Affiliate 
Filing 
Principal 
Place of 
Assets 
Barzel 
Industries 
Inc.238 
1  D. Del.  1   
Beach First 
National 
Bancshares, 
Inc.239 
 1 D.S.C. 1    
BearingPoint, 
Inc.240 1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
Blockbuster 
Inc.241 1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
Borders Group, 
Inc.242 1  S.D.N.Y.    1 
Buffets 
Holdings, Inc. 
(‘08)243 
1  D. Del.  1   
Buffets 
Holdings, Inc. 
(‘12)244 
1  D. Del.  1   
Building 
Materials 
Holding 
Corp.245 
1  D. Del.  1   
Capital Corp of 
the West246  1 E.D. Cal. 1    
                                                                                                                          
238 In re Barzel Indus. Inc., No. 09-13204 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 15, 2009). 
239 In re Beach First Nat’l Bancshares, Inc., No. 10-03499 (Bankr. D.S.C. May 14, 2010). 
240 In re BearingPoint, Inc., No. 09-10691 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2009). 
241 In re Blockbuster Inc., No. 10-1499 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2010). 
242 In re Borders Grp., Inc., No. 11-10614 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011). 
243 In re Buffets Holdings (‘08), No. 08-10141 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 22, 2008). 
244 In re Buffets Holdings (‘12), No. 12-10238 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 18, 2012). 
245 In re Bldg. Materials Holding Corp., No. 09-12074 (Bankr. D. Del. June 16, 2009). 
246 In re Capital Corp. of the W., No. 09-14298 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. May 11, 2009). 
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Corporation 
Name 
Forum 
Shopped 
Did 
Not 
Forum 
Shop 
District 
Filed 
Bases for Establishing Venue 
Principal 
Place of 
Business 
State of 
Incorp. 
Affiliate 
Filing 
Principal 
Place of 
Assets 
Capmark 
Financial 
Group, Inc.247 
1  D. Del.   1  
CEI 
Liquidation 
Estate 248 
1  D. Del.    1  
Charter 
Communicatio
ns, Inc.249 
1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
Chemtura 
Corp.250 1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
Canal Corp.251  1 E.D. Va. 1    
CIB Marine 
Bancshares, 
Inc.252  
1 E.D. Wis. 1    
Circuit City 
Stores, Inc.253  1 E.D. Va. 1    
CIT Group 
Inc.254  1 S.D.N.Y. 1    
Citadel 
Broadcasting 
Corp.255 
1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
The Colonial 
BancGroup, 
Inc.256  
1 M.D. Ala. 1    
                                                                                                                          
247 In re Capmark Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 09-13684 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 25, 2009). 
248 In re CEI Liquidation Estate, No. 09-14019 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 15, 2009). 
249 In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., No. 09-11435 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 27, 2009). 
250 In re Chemtura Corp., No. 09-11233 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2009). 
251 In re Canal Corp., No. 08-36642 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Dec. 29, 2008). 
252 In re CIB Marine Bancshares, Inc., No. 09-33318 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. Sept. 15, 2009). 
253 In re Circuit City Stores, Inc., No. 08-35653 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 10, 2008). 
254 In re CIT Grp., Inc., No. 09-16565 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 1, 2009). 
255 In re Citadel Broad. Corp., No. 09-17442 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 20, 2009). 
256 In re The Colonial BancGroup, Inc., No. 09-32303 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. Aug. 25, 2009). 
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Corporation 
Name 
Forum 
Shopped 
Did 
Not 
Forum 
Shop 
District 
Filed 
Bases for Establishing Venue 
Principal 
Place of 
Business 
State of 
Incorp. 
Affiliate 
Filing 
Principal 
Place of 
Assets 
Community 
Bancorp257  1 D. Nev. 1    
Constar 
International 
Inc.258 
1  D. Del.  1   
Cooperative 
Bankshares, 
Inc.259 
1  E.D.N.C. 1    
Cooper-
Standard 
Holdings 
Inc.260 
1  D. Del.  1   
Corus 
Bankshares, 
Inc.261  
1 N.D. Ill. 1    
Delta Financial 
Corp.262 1  D. Del.  1   
Delta 
Petroleum 
Corp.263 
1  D. Del.  1   
Downey 
Financial 
Corp.264 
1  D. Del.  1   
Dynegy 
Roseton, 
LLC265 
1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
Eastman 
Kodak Co.266 1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
                                                                                                                          
257 In re Cmty. Bancorp, No. 10-20038 (Bankr. D. Nev. May 28, 2010). 
258 In re Constar Int’l, Inc., No. 08-13432 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 30, 2008). 
259 In re Coop. Bankshares, Inc., No. 09-06989 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. Aug. 19, 2009). 
260 In re Cooper-Standard Holdings Inc., No. 09-12743 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 3, 2009). 
261 In re Corus Bankshares, Inc., No. 10-26881 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. June 15, 2010). 
262 In re Delta Fin. Corp., No. 07-11880 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 17, 2007). 
263 In re Delta Petroleum Corp., No. 11-14006 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 15, 2011). 
264 In re Downey Fin. Corp., No. 08-13041 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 25, 2008). 
265 In re Dynegy Roseton, L.L.C., No. 11-38107 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 7, 2011). 
266 In re Eastman Kodak Co., No. 12-10202 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 19, 2012). 
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Corporation 
Name 
Forum 
Shopped 
Did 
Not 
Forum 
Shop 
District 
Filed 
Bases for Establishing Venue 
Principal 
Place of 
Business 
State of 
Incorp. 
Affiliate 
Filing 
Principal 
Place of 
Assets 
EBHI 
Holdings, 
Inc.267 
1  D. Del.  1   
Energy 
Partners, 
Ltd.268 
1  S.D. Tex.   1  
FairPoint 
Communicatio
ns, Inc.269 
1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
Finlay 
Enterprises, 
Inc.270  
1 S.D.N.Y. 1    
First National 
Bancshares, 
Inc.271  
1 D.S.C. 1    
FirstFed 
Financial 
Corporation.272  
1 C.D. Cal. 1    
Fleetwood 
Enterprises, 
Inc.273  
1 C.D. Cal. 1    
Franklin Bank 
Corporation.274 1  D. Del.  1   
Fremont 
General 
Corporation.275  
1 C.D. Cal. 1    
Frontier 
Airlines 
Holdings, 
Inc.276 
1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
                                                                                                                          
267 In re EBHI Holdings, Inc., No. 09-12099 (Bankr. D. Del. June 17, 2009). 
268 In re Energy Partners, Ltd., No. 09-32957 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. May 1, 2009). 
269 In re FairPoint Commc’ns, Inc., No. 09-16335 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 2009). 
270 In re Finlay Enter., Inc., No. 09-14873 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2009). 
271 In re First Nat’l Bancshares, Inc., No. 10-09281 (Bankr. D.S.C. Dec. 31, 2010). 
272 In re FirstFed Fin. Corp., No. 10-12927 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Jan. 6, 2010). 
273 In re Fleetwood Enter., Inc., No. 09-14254 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2009). 
274 In re Franklin Bank Corp., No. 08-12924 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 12, 2008). 
275 In re Fremont Gen. Corp., No. 08-13421 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. June 18, 2008). 
276 In re Frontier Airlines Holdings, Inc., No. 08-11298 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 10, 2008). 
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Corporation 
Name 
Forum 
Shopped 
Did 
Not 
Forum 
Shop 
District 
Filed 
Bases for Establishing Venue 
Principal 
Place of 
Business 
State of 
Incorp. 
Affiliate 
Filing 
Principal 
Place of 
Assets 
General 
Growth 
Properties, 
Inc.277 
1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
General 
Maritime 
Corp.278  
1 S.D.N.Y. 1    
General 
Motors 
Corp.279 
1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
Global 
Aviation 
Holdings 
Inc.280 
1  E.D.N.Y.   1  
The Great 
Atlantic & 
Pacific Tea 
Company.281 
1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
Guaranty 
Financial 
Group, Inc.282 
1  N.D. Tex.    1 
Harrington 
West Financial 
Group, Inc.283  
1 C.D .Cal. 1    
Hartmarx 
Corp.284  1 N.D. Ill. 1    
Hawaiian 
Telcom 
Communicatio
ns, Inc.285 
1  
D. Del. 
(Trans. to 
D. Haw.)  
1   
                                                                                                                          
277 In re Gen. Growth Props., Inc., No. 09-11977 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2009). 
278 In re Gen. Mar. Corp., No. 11-15285 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2011). 
279 In re Gen. Motors Corp., No. 09-50026 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 1, 2009). 
280 In re Global Aviation Holdings Inc., No. 12-40783 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2012). 
281 In re Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., No. 10-24549 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 12, 2010). 
282 In re Guar. Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 09-35582 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Aug. 27, 2009). 
283 In re Harrington W. Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 10-14677 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Sept. 10, 2010). 
284 In re Hartmarx Corp., No. 09-02046 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Jan. 23, 2009). 
285 In re Hawaiian Telcom Comm’ns, Inc., No. 08-13086 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 1, 2008). 
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Corporation 
Name 
Forum 
Shopped 
Did 
Not 
Forum 
Shop 
District 
Filed 
Bases for Establishing Venue 
Principal 
Place of 
Business 
State of 
Incorp. 
Affiliate 
Filing 
Principal 
Place of 
Assets 
Hawker 
Beechcraft 
Acquisition 
Co.286 
1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
Hayes 
Lemmerz 
International, 
Inc.287 
1  D. Del.  1   
Herbst 
Gaming, Inc.288 1  D. Nev. 1    
HomeBanc 
Corp.289 1  D. Del.   1  
Idearc, Inc.290  1 N.D. Tex. 1    
Imperial 
Capital 
Bancorp, 
Inc.291 
 1 S.D. Cal. 1    
IndyMac 
Bancorp, 
Inc.292  
1 C.D. Cal. 1    
Integrity 
Bancshares, 
Inc.293  
1 N.D. Ga. 1    
ION Media 
Networks, 
Inc.294 
1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
Irwin Financial 
Corporation.295  1 S.D. Ind. 1    
                                                                                                                          
286 In re Hawker Beechcraft Acquisition Co., No. 12-11877 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 3, 2012). 
287 In re Hayes Lemmerz Int’l, Inc., No. 09-11655 (Bankr. D. Del. May 11, 2009). 
288 In re Herbst Gaming, Inc., No. 09-50752 (Bankr. D. Nev. Mar. 22, 2009). 
289 In re HomeBanc Corp., No. 07-11080 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 9, 2007). 
290 In re Idearc, Inc., No. 09-31828 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2009). 
291 In re Imperial Capital Bancorp, Inc., No. 09-19431 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. Dec. 18, 2009). 
292 In re IndyMac Bancorp, Inc., No. 08-21752 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. July 31, 2008). 
293 In re Integrity Bancshares, Inc., No. 08-80512 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. Oct. 10, 2008). 
294 In re ION Media Networks, Inc., No. 09-13125 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2009). 
295 In re Irwin Fin. Corp., No. 09-13852 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Sept. 18, 2009). 
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Corporation 
Name 
Forum 
Shopped 
Did 
Not 
Forum 
Shop 
District 
Filed 
Bases for Establishing Venue 
Principal 
Place of 
Business 
State of 
Incorp. 
Affiliate 
Filing 
Principal 
Place of 
Assets 
Journal 
Register Co.296 1  S.D.N.Y.    1 
Kimball Hill, 
Inc.297  1 N.D. Ill. 1    
LandAmerica 
Financial 
Group, Inc.298  
1 E.D. Va. 1    
Lear Corp.299 1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
Lee 
Enterprises, 
Inc.300 
1  D. Del.  1   
Lehman 
Brothers 
Holdings 
Inc.301 
 1 S.D.N.Y. 1    
Linens ‘n 
Things, Inc.302 1  D. Del.  1   
Local Insight 
Regatta 
Holdings303 
1  D. Del.  1   
Luminent 
Mortgage 
Capital, Inc.304 
1  D. Md.  1   
                                                                                                                          
296 In re Journal Register Co., No. 09-10769 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 21, 2009). 
297 In re Kimball Hill, Inc., No. 08-10095 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Apr. 23, 2008). 
298 In re LandAmerica Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 08-35994 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Nov. 26, 2008). 
299 In re Lear Corp., No. 09-14326 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. July 7, 2009). 
300 In re Lee Enters., Inc., No. 11-13918 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 12, 2011). 
301 In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 15, 2008). 
302 In re Linens ‘n Things, Inc., No. 08-10833 (Bankr. D. Del. May 2, 2008). 
303 In re Local Insight Regatta Holdings, No. 10-13686 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 17, 2010). 
304 In re Luminent Mortg. Capital, Inc., No. 08-21389 (Bankr. D. Md. Sept. 5, 2008). 
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Corporation 
Name 
Forum 
Shopped 
Did 
Not 
Forum 
Shop 
District 
Filed 
Bases for Establishing Venue 
Principal 
Place of 
Business 
State of 
Incorp. 
Affiliate 
Filing 
Principal 
Place of 
Assets 
Lyondell 
Chemical 
Co.305 
1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
Magna 
Entertainment 
Corp.306 
1  D. Del.  1   
MagnaChip 
Semiconductor 
LLC307 
1  D. Del.  1   
Merisant 
Worldwide, 
Inc.308 
1  D. Del.  1   
Meruelo Farms 
LLC309 1  C.D. Cal. 1    
Mesa Air 
Group, Inc.310 1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
MF Global 
Holdings 
Ltd.311  
1 S.D.N.Y.   1  
Midwest Banc 
Holdings, 
Inc.312  
1 N.D. Ill. 1    
Milacron 
Inc.313  1 S.D. Ohio 1    
                                                                                                                          
305 In re Lyondell Chem. Co., No. 09-10023 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 6, 2009). 
306 In re Magna Entm’t Corp., No. 09-10720 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 5, 2009). 
307 In re MagnaChip Semiconductor LLC, No. 09-12009 (Bankr. D. Del. June 12, 2009). 
308 In re Merisant Worldwide, Inc., No. 09-10059 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 9, 2009). 
309 In re Meruelo Farms LLC, No. 09-13358 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Mar. 27, 2009). 
310 In re Mesa Air Grp., Inc., No. 10-10018 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2010). 
311 In re MF Global Holdings Ltd., No. 11-15059 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 31, 2011). 
312 In re Midwest Banc Holdings, Inc., No. 10-37319 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 20, 2010). 
313 In re MI 2009 Inc., No. 09-11235 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Mar. 10, 2009). 
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Corporation 
Name 
Forum 
Shopped 
Did 
Not 
Forum 
Shop 
District 
Filed 
Bases for Establishing Venue 
Principal 
Place of 
Business 
State of 
Incorp. 
Affiliate 
Filing 
Principal 
Place of 
Assets 
Monaco Coach 
Corp.314 1  D. Del.  1   
Movie Gallery, 
Inc. (‘07)315 1  E.D. Va.   1  
Movie Gallery, 
Inc. (‘10)316 1  E.D. Va.   1  
Nebraska Book 
Co.317 1  D. Del.   1  
Neff Corp.318 1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
NetBank, 
Inc.319 1  M.D. Fla.    1 
New Century 
Financial 
Corp.320 
1  D. Del.   1  
Newark Group, 
Inc.321  1 D.N.J. 1    
NewPage 
Corp.322 1  D. Del.  1   
                                                                                                                          
314 In re MCC, No. 09-10750 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 5, 2009). 
315 In re Movie Gallery, Inc., No. 07-33849 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Oct. 16, 2007). 
316 In re Movie Gallery, Inc., No. 10-30696 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Feb. 2, 2010). 
317 In re Neb. Book Co. Inc., No. 11-12005 (Bankr. D. Del. June 27, 2011). 
318 In re NR Liquidation Ill Co. Inc., No. 10-12610 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. May. 16, 2010). 
319 In re NetBank, Inc., No. 07-04295 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Sept. 28, 2007). 
320 In re New Century Fin. Corp., No. 07-10417 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 2, 2007). 
321 In re Newark Grp., Inc., No. 91-32683 (Banr. D.N.J. May 10, 1991). 
322 In re NewPage Corp., No. 11-12804 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 7, 2011). 
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Nexity 
Financial 
Corp.323 
1  D. Del.  1   
Noble 
International, 
Ltd.324  
1 E.D. Mich. 1    
Nortel 
Networks 
Corp.325 
1  D. Del.  1   
NTK Holdings, 
Inc.326 1  D. Del.  1   
Orleans 
Homebuilders, 
Inc.327 
1  D. Del.  1   
PFF Bancorp, 
Inc.328 1  D. Del.  1   
Pilgrim’s Pride 
Corp.329 1  N.D. Tex.   1  
Pinnacle 
Airlines 
Corp.330 
1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
Pliant Corp.331 1  D. Del.  1   
                                                                                                                          
323 In re Nexity Fin. Corp., No. 10-12293 (Bankr. D. Del. July 22, 2010). 
324 In re Noble Int’l, Ltd., No. 09-51720 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Apr. 15, 2009). 
325 In re Nortel Networks Corp., No. 09-10138 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 14, 2009). 
326 In re NTK Holdings, Inc., No. 09-13611 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 21, 2009). 
327 In re Orleans Homebuilders, Inc., No. 10-10684 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 1, 2010). 
328 In re PFF Bancorp, Inc., No. 08-13127 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 5, 2008). 
329 In re Pilgrim’s Pride Corp., No. 08-45664 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Dec. 1, 2008). 
330 In re Pinnacle Airlines Corp., No. 12-11343 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 1, 2012). 
331 In re Pliant Corp., No. 09-10443 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 11, 2009). 
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PMI Group, 
Inc.332 1  D. Del.  1   
Pope & Talbot, 
Inc.333 1  D. Del.  1   
Propex, Inc.334  1 
E.D. 
Tenn. 1    
R.H. 
Donnelley 
Corp.335 
1  D. Del.  1   
Remy 
International, 
Inc.336 
1  D. Del.  1   
RHI 
Entertainment, 
Inc.337  
1 S.D.N.Y. 1    
Sbarro, Inc.338 1  S.D.N.Y.  1   
Seahawk 
Drilling, Inc.339 1  S.D. Tex. 1    
Security Bank 
Corp.340  1 M.D. Ga. 1    
                                                                                                                          
332 In re PMI Grp., Inc., No. 11-13730 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 23, 2011). 
333 In re Pope & Talbot, Inc., No. 07-11738 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 19, 2007). 
334  In re Fabrics Estate Inc., No. 08-10249 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. Jan. 18, 2008). 
335 In re R.H. Donnelley Corp., No. 09-11833 (Bankr. D. Del. May 28, 2009). 
336 In re Remy Int’l, Inc., No. 07-11481 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 8, 2007). 
337 In re RHI Entm’t, Inc., No. 10-16536 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Dec. 10, 2010). 
338 In re Sbarro, Inc., No. 11-11527 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2011). 
339 In re Seahawk Drilling, Inc., No. 11-20089 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 11, 2011). 
340 In re Sec. Bank Corp., No. 09-52409 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. July 31, 2009). 
 222 CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 46:159 
Corporation 
Name 
Forum 
Shopped 
Did 
Not 
Forum 
Shop 
District 
Filed 
Bases for Establishing Venue 
Principal 
Place of 
Business 
State of 
Incorp. 
Affiliate 
Filing 
Principal 
Place of 
Assets 
Silver State 
Bancorp341  1 D. Nev. 1    
Simmons 
Co.342 1  D. Del.  1   
Sirva, Inc.343 1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
Premier 
International 
Holdings 
Inc.344 
1  D. Del.  1   
Smurfit-Stone 
Container 
Corp.345 
1  D. Del.  1   
Source 
Interlink Co.346 1  D. Del.  1   
Spansion 
Inc.347 1  D. Del.  1   
Spectrum 
Brands, Inc.348 1  W.D. Tex.   1  
Station 
Casinos, Inc.349 1  D. Nev.   1  
                                                                                                                          
341 In re Silver State Bancorp, No. 09-10069 (Bankr. D. Nev. Jan. 6, 2009). 
342 In re Simmons Co., No. 09-14038 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 16, 2009). 
343 In re Sirva, Inc., No. 08-10433 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 5, 2008). 
344 In re Premier Int’l Holdings Inc., No. 09-12019 (Bankr. D. Del. June 13, 2009). 
345 In re Smurfit-Stone Container Corp., No. 09-10235 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 26, 2009). 
346 In re Source Interlink Co., No. 09-11424 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 27, 2009). 
347 In re Spansion Inc., No. 09-10690 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 1, 2009). 
348 In re Spectrum Brands, Inc., No. 09-50456 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. Feb. 3, 2009). 
349 In re Station Casinos, Inc., No. 09-52477 (Bankr. D. Nev. July 28, 2009). 
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Syntax-Brillian 
Corp.350 1  D. Del.  1   
Tarragon 
Corp.351 1  D.N.J.   1  
TBS 
International 
plc352 
1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
Team 
Financial, 
Inc.353 
1  D. Kan. 1    
Temecula 
Valley 
Bancorp Inc.354  
1 C.D. Cal. 1    
TerreStar 
Corp.355 1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
TerreStar 
Networks 
Inc.356 
1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
The Reader's 
Digest Ass’n357 1  S.D.N.Y. 1    
                                                                                                                          
350 In re Syntax-Brillian Corp., No. 08-11407 (Bankr. D. Del. July 8, 2008). 
351 In re Tarragon Corp., No. 09-10555 (Bankr. D.N.J. Jan. 12, 2009). 
352 In re TBS Int’l plc, No. 12-22225 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 6, 2012). 
353 In re Team Fin., Inc., No. 09-10925 (Bankr. D. Kan. Apr. 5, 2009). 
354 In re Temecula Valley Bancorp Inc., No. 09-36828 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Nov. 6, 2009). 
355 In re TerreStar Corp., No. 11-10612 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 16, 2011). 
356 In re TerreStar Networks Inc., No. 10-15446 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2010). 
357 In re Reader’s Digest Ass’n, No. 09-23529 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 24, 2009). 
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Thornburg 
Mortgage, 
Inc.358 
1  D. Md.  1   
TierOne 
Corp.359  1 D. Neb. 1    
TOUSA, 
Inc.360  1 S.D. Fla. 1    
Tribune Co.361 1  D. Del.  1   
Trico Marine 
Services, 
Inc.362 
1  D. Del.  1   
Tronox Inc.363 1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
Trump 
Entertainment 
Resorts, Inc.364  
1 D.N.J. 1    
TXCO 
Resources 
Inc.365  
1 W.D. Tex. 1    
                                                                                                                          
358 In re Thornburg Mortg., Inc., No. 09-17787 (Bankr. D. Md. May 1, 2009). 
359 In re TierOne Corp., No. 10-41974 (Bankr. D. Neb. June 24, 2010). 
360 In re TOUSA, Inc., No. 08-10928 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. Jan. 29, 2008). 
361 In re Tribune Co., No. 08-13141 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 8, 2008). 
362 In re Trico Marine Servs., Inc., No. 10-12653 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 25, 2010). 
363 In re Tronox Inc., No. 09-10156 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 12, 2009). 
364 In re Trump Entm’t Resorts, Inc., No. 09-13655 (Bankr. D.N.J. Feb. 17, 2009). 
365 In re TXCO Res. Inc., No. 09-51807 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. May 17, 2009). 
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UCBH 
Holdings366  1 N.D. Cal. 1    
United 
Western 
Bancorp, 
Inc.367 
 1 D. Colo. 1    
VeraSun 
Energy 
Corp.368 
1  D. Del.   1  
Vertis 
Holdings, 
Inc.369 
1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
Vertis, Inc.370 1  D. Del.  1   
Vineyard 
National 
Bancorp371 
1  C.D. Cal. 1    
Visteon 
Corp.372 1  D. Del.  1   
Washington 
Mutual, Inc.373 1  D. Del.   1  
                                                                                                                          
366 In re UCBH Holdings, No. 09-33701 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. Nov. 24, 2009). 
367 In re United W. Bancorp, Inc., No. 12-13815 (Bankr. D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2012). 
368 In re VeraSun Energy Corp., No. 08-12606 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 31, 2008). 
369 In re Vertis Holdings, Inc., No. 10-16170 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov. 17, 2010). 
370 In re Vertis, Inc., No. 08-11461 (Bankr. D. Del. July 15, 2008). 
371 In re Vineyard Nat’l Bancorp, No. 09-26401 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. July 21, 2009). 
372 In re Visteon Corp., No. 09-11786 (Bankr. D. Del. May 28, 2009). 
373 In re Wash. Mut., Inc., No. 08-12229 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 26, 2008). 
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WCI 
Communities, 
Inc.374 
1  D. Del.  1   
Wellman, 
Inc.375 1  S.D.N.Y.   1  
William Lyon 
Homes376 1  D. Del.  1   
Xerium 
Technologies, 
Inc.377 
1  D. Del.  1   
Young 
Broadcasting, 
Inc.378  
1 S.D.N.Y. 1    
TOTALS 110 49  56 53 45 5 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                          
374 In re WCI Cmtys., Inc., No. 08-11643 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 4, 2008). 
375 In re Wellman, Inc., No. 08-10595 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2008). 
376 In re William Lyon Homes, No. 11-14019 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 19, 2011). 
377 In re Xerium Techs., Inc., No. 10-11031 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 30, 2010). 
378 In re Young Broad., Inc., No. 09-10645 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 13, 2009). 
